PAS 79 uses the term as a conclusion and I take it to mean an acceptable level of risk once reasonable controls are in place i.e the risk of persons being hurt in a fire is acceptably low but not eradicated.

Torrerable risk is a widly used principles in risk management - with regards safety risk, is not similar to the test of Reasonable Practicable?

It is used in 18001 I also believe..........

First used, in relation to safety, in this paper I believe http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/tolerability.pdf

Spot on Nandkumar. The 2007 revision to ISO 18001 replaced the 1999 term “tolerable risk” with “acceptable risk”.

'Tolerable risk' and 'ALARP' terms are widely used when doing QRA and ALARP justification assessments in the oil/gas/petro chemical industry.

R2P2 also used quite frequently.

I have had sight of many examples where an organisation operates with a 'Risk Register' and some risks are documented as 'Tolerable'. This is taken by management as 'we can live with the risk' however, there was no control measures considered or applied to any risk considered as 'Tolerable'. I think the word 'Tolerable' is open to mislead.

Tolerability of Risk (ToR) terminology is primarily used in quantitative risk assessments required in high hazard industries that have permissioning regimes.

OHSAS 18001/2 and BS 18004 refer to "Acceptable Risks" in its terminology and definitions section, but goes on to define that acceptable risk as one "that has been reduced to a level that can be tolerated by
the organization having regard to its legal obligations and its own OH&S policy"

Therefore in general terms, when you do not undertake quantitative risk assessments for high hazard industries, it is for your organisation to decide where you want to demarcate the tolerable risk criteria in the complete framework of law, corporate policies etc.

Digressing slightly, R2P2 is a key document that describes HSE’s decision-making process. It is supposed to make transparent the protocols and procedures HSE follows to ensure that the process of decision-making, including risk assessment and risk management, is perceived as valid. Professionally, I found it very informative.

There was an extensive consultation in the form of a Discussion Document in May 1999 prior to the publication of this document in 2001. The preface, introduction and its purpose gives more details regarding R2P2.

A major purpose of the document was to set out an overall framework for decision taking by HSE which would ensure consistency and coherence across the full range of risks falling within the scope of the Health and Safety at Work Act. This framework was based on the method which HSE applies to the control of risk at nuclear power stations, originally published in 1988 as The tolerability of risks from nuclear power stations . The publication of the discussion document in 1999 was reinforced due to the need to publish a description of HSE’s decision-making process as public concern over such matters as Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), railway safety and food safety intensified the call for openness about how decisions are taken on the regulation of risks. The public is also more aware that, given few activities are without any risk, there must be a balance between the health and safety measures introduced to eliminate or control risks, and the costs arising or benefits forgone when the measures are introduced.


http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/r2p2.pdf

R Rue

If you google R2P2 you'll get to the pdf.

Although there may have been an element of good fortune, surely the intentions and commitment by all concerned in the planning and construction of the London Olympic site, a massive project, played a major part in making it the first ever Olympic site to be completed without any fatalities.

Also, it's curious that though considerable resources are devoted in the UK to minimising death and injury from work activities, a comparable standard of resources doesn't seem to be devoted to reducing deaths, serious injury and all the other adverse consequences of road accidents in the UK. If such a standard were to be pursued to reduce the financial and other burden of such accidents, perhaps the UK would introduce measures like re-testing drivers say every 10 years and requiring proof of good eyesight, corrected if necessary, say every 5 years!

I'll hit 'post' now and anticipate some fairly prompt responses to protest that such suggestions would involve infringements of freedom and human rights, etc!

Taking the term ‘tolerable risk’ from the HSE’s publication on the Nuclear Industry and R2P2 document means specific things in relation to operations with major consequences resulting from systems that fail. Once the term is applied to other work its meaning get kicked about and as Graham points out, to whom then is the risk ‘tolerable’?

There have been some interesting posts over the years which almost lead to the position that risk assessment – coupled with the qualifying term ‘reasonably practicable’ – is some kind of scientific process which gets you to an impartial measure on which you can confidently propose control measures.

For most occupations I have always thought of the risk assessment process as a guided form of guesswork. You do your best with the available information and experience to put control measures in place to either eliminate the risk – where you can – or adequately control the risks that cannot be eliminated. As such, concepts of ZERO HARM can be useful because they maintain an approach akin to ‘continuous challenge’ of existing control measures. Should this be done systematically – in a ‘reasonably practicable’ way of course – then the business concept of ‘continuous improvement’ can be applied to health and safety standards.

The preventative solutions to most workplace accidents are well known but not consistently applied across all organisations. To argue that there will always be accidents at work is to imply that the ability to accurately predict the future has arrived. I’m not convinced that anybody has that ability just yet. Who knows what the future holds in 1, 5 or 10 years?

In the meantime it may be useful to try and close the organisational gap between those who have to face the risks and those who have the resources to eliminate or adequately control such risks. Indeed this might even make work more tolerable generally.

Cheers.

Nigel

Graham the official UK Government Value for Preventing a (statistical) Fatality (VPF) is currently in excess of £1.5m and this value is used, albeit not consistently, in decision making as regards safety improvements e.g. in relation to transport.

Sometimes (certainly in rail, not sure where else) it's extended to the Value for Preventing and equivalent Fatality, where in short, 1F = 10 major injuries = 200 over 3 day injury accidents, and not like for like alternatives for injuries to the public.