Welcome Guest! The IOSH forums are a free resource to both members and non-members. Login or register to use them

Postings made by forum users are personal opinions. IOSH is not responsible for the content or accuracy of any of the information contained in forum postings. Please carefully consider any advice you receive.

Notification

Icon
Error

Options
Go to last post Go to first unread
Admin  
#1 Posted : 21 July 2005 15:48:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Lumpy I'm interested in this subject and have researched the methodology, which in all honesty looks very promising. IOSH seem to support Behavioural Safety, but in the main, the Unions do not. In fact the Unions give this subject considerable bad press ... why? Lumpy
Admin  
#2 Posted : 21 July 2005 16:04:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Robert K Lewis Simple - Its been badly done - the methodology commonly used utilises people making fixed observational judgement on correct or incorrect behaviours - It will only work so long before people rebel. Real cultural change is much more about motivating team and peer loyalty and mutual support in safe behaviour. Bob
Admin  
#3 Posted : 21 July 2005 17:01:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Kieran J Duignan I agree with the general thrust of Bob's comment. From my experience with high hazard sectors where behaivoural safety is well-planned and well done, the unions co-operate constructively. I've been involved in introducing it in a modest way in settings where it's never been considered before, e.g. training laboratory technicians to provide structured feedback to each other on harmful or correct postures. While they needed encouragement to offer their views, they also recognised that this engaged them much more than expecting 'management' to either 'pounce' on them or to do nothing. In a sense, 'behavioural safety' is rather like intelligent selling: 1. learn how to do what behaviour should work effectively, 2. get feedback on your behaviour from well-intentioned, intelligent observers; 3. learn from the feedback and your own experience. In the 'real world', just as 'competent safety management' can be misrepresented or muddled, 'behavioural safety' can be corrupted. It's understandable if trades unions observe corrupted 'behavioural safety' and take a stand against it but they'd be much more effective if they negotiated for competent training in behavioural safety.
Admin  
#4 Posted : 21 July 2005 19:11:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Raymond Rapp Lumpy The TUs have been opposed to the concept of BBS mainly because it tends to transfer the blame from management to the individual(s) worker. There are many examples good, bad and indifferent. You might like to try the archives of Hazards Magazine, who did an interesting article on the subject a couple of years ago. Only this week I was talking to a chap who works for a large public utility and he described the process in his company where the company donate money to charity. The inital figure donated starts quite high, but drastically reduces for each and every accident reported. Clearly, the end result is not that which is pledged and is in my opinion immoral. It can also have the effect of driving underground the reporting of accidents and near misses. Ray
Admin  
#5 Posted : 21 July 2005 20:08:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Merv Newman Union/employee resistance to Behavioural Based safety starts from the traditional "them and us" dichotomy. Management say that accidents are the employee's fault. Unions say that safety is management's fault. When implementing BBS programmes we try to reduce management's role to that of facilitating and supporting an employee-run programme. However, management must commit to solving/eliminating barriers to the chosen safe behaviours. * Safe behaviours are defined by the work group. (1st line supervisor and his team) with input from union and H&S * Baselining (where are we today ? ) is done by a member of the team (not the supervisor) * improvement objective is chosen by the team. management/supervision influence is forbidden. * Daily observations, measurement and feedback are done by the team's chosen observer. * Weekly feedback meetings are run by the observer. * Way-points are celebrated by the team who MAY invite a manager to participate. And the manager does not come to make a speech - he/she is there to listen to the team celebrating their success. I can't count how many teams we have put into place, hundreds. Occasionally we will get a union rep who is sceptical (more or less strongly expressed) but if you canmotivate the rest of the team then the union guys will usually go along. Or the team won't take much notice. And I personallly only count one miss - a totally macho team of motorway patrollers. Base lined themselves at 92%. Chose an objective of 93% and blamed failure on the management. Mind you, I see these people on our local motorway (autoroute) at least once a week and I reckon that their safety behaviour is pretty good. Compare your work environment to theirs - a 40 truck going past at 60 mph 1 metre from your backside every 10 seconds. You just have to develop safe habits. The negative reinforcement values rate pretty high.
Admin  
#6 Posted : 22 July 2005 08:32:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Allan St.John Holt To answer Lumpy's original question, the unions and others including myself have severe reservations about the ethics of setting people to 'spy' on other people. The other issue that has not been mentioned is that an behavioural programme needs to come after all the physical hazards have been properly controlled, and not as a substitute. Management too often fall into BS programmes with relief that someone has just confirmed their view that safety is only a people problem. What we need to achieve, of course, is people behaving safely in a safe environment. We don't need a situation where these are (even subconsciously) treated as alternatives. I am aware that BS programmes come in many forms, and the above objections may not be universally applicable to the newer programmes. Allan
Admin  
#7 Posted : 22 July 2005 08:46:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Kieran J Duignan Allan's observations unfortunately appear to confuse two misconceptions about behavioural safety. 1. The first is the sheer abuse of the practice. His use of the concept of 'spying' illustrates dramatically an abuse and corruption of behavioural safety - and of safety management of any kind. Where management corrupt a process based on valid, thorough research, this is the sole responsbility of management. It is surely reasonable to expect competent safety practitioners to clearly differentiate between corrupt and abusive use of a process and competent, constructive and effective uses 2. Allan's other main reservation introduces a counsel of perfection which has neither legal nor operational validity. it's simply inaccurate to assert that Behavioural Safety requires control of all physical hazards, for the simple reason that not all physical hazards can be fully controlled due to lack of well-founded knowledge. For example, it is not possible to specify fully how to control physical (and behavioural) hazards associated with musculo-skeletal disorders, when the leading world authorities (e.g. Chaffin, Anderson and Martin, 1999) acknowledge numerous gaps in relevant research. In such circumstances, Behavoural safety enables managers and employees to apply available research to control relevant physical hazards as well as anyone can.
Admin  
#8 Posted : 22 July 2005 08:59:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Lumpy Thanks for your postings. My concern is that I have yet to find one TU that accepts that BS has anything positive about it. Every TU site seems to be opposed to the BS approach ... full stop. I believe that, like any initiative, there are pros / cons, my problem is that the TUs don't seem to recognise any pros. If you look at HAZARD magazine, as suggested by Ray, every article is very negative. We have seen a 55% reduction in our accident rate over the last four years, but we seem to have bottomed out. The HSE estimate 80-90% of accidents are due to unsafe acts (86% within my organisation), so I am looking at anything that may have an impact in this area, and that includes BS techniques. Trouble is I have very strong Unions and I very much doubt they will even enter into consultation. They will instead promote the negative amongst the workforce which will make implementation (if we go down this route) impossible.
Admin  
#9 Posted : 22 July 2005 09:06:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By peter gotch Lumpy, The Hazards article that Ray refers to is at http://www.hazards.org/bs/badbehaviour.htm Regards, Peter
Admin  
#10 Posted : 22 July 2005 09:22:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Kieran J Duignan Lumpy Your expanded version of the issue has more to do with 'management of change' than about Behavioural Safety as such. In this light, here are four suggestions to consider: a. explore the possibility of introducing behavioural safety into an area like preventing musculo-skeletal disorders, where few other methods can be as effective b. enlist an occupational health/safety psychologist who is interviewed jointly by you and trades unions to check his acceptability to both 'sides' c. Read a good guide to the psychological tripwires in management of change, e.g. chapter 5 of 'Change in Organisations' (P Clarkson, Whurr, 1995), which classifies the 4 forms of barriers to change. Using Clarkson's model, what you are talking about may not be the 'danger' barrier but those of confusion, conflict and lack of understanding; they each require different approaches. d. applying Clarkson's model or otherwise, enable the specific trade union people you have to work with to move beyond the beliefs which colour their perceptions, to agreement to testing out shared values in a pilot project with a few employees in an area where the manager is supportive. In this way, both management and trades unions share the risks involved in learning.
Admin  
#11 Posted : 22 July 2005 10:11:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By LISA JERVIS Lumpy I would be very interested in hearing how you get on with your unions. I am doing my dissertation on behavioural safety programmes, in particular looking at their effectiveness. I am working for a company at the moment who operate a behavioural safety programme, which in general is pretty effective and is pretty well supported by unions (although it has been in place for about 5 years now). If done correctly behavioural safety programmes are a good way to get everyone involved in safety and 'shop floor' respond much better to their co-workers telling them their doing something incorrectly than management. If you haven't looked at it already read the HSE research report 430/2002 (strategies to promote safe behaviour as part of a h&s Mgt. sytem) Lisa
Admin  
#12 Posted : 22 July 2005 10:43:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By john fitzgibbon Sorry to be negative, but in my experience it is a waste of time and provides very little in terms of outcome (this includes "cultural shift" etc). It does however provide a rich new seam for the consultants devising the programme and an associated set of new buzz words for the H&S dictionary. It is like the Emperors new clothes,if he says they look fine....... That is my opinion, however on a more positive note HSE Contract Research Report 430/2002 entitled "Strategies to promote safe behaviour as part of a health and safety management system" prepared by the Keil Centre offers a more quantitative (and more balanced!) view - available as a pdf via the HSE website.
Admin  
#13 Posted : 22 July 2005 11:07:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Kieran J Duignan John Would you be so kind as to provide relevant details of what exactly you mean by 'it' when you write: "in my experience it is a waste of time and provides very little in terms of outcome" What baselines were your experience based on? What evidence, over what timeperiod, with how many people, and with what classes of hazards did you gather date to evaluate your experience as objectively as possible? How did your personal conclusions compare and contrast with those of others? All major changes in safety and other behaviour at work tend ot be controversial. Safety is an area where debate based on relevant evidence and reasonsed argument can be very fruitful. Where it is not conducted this way, we risk remaining stuck in the sad, Jeremy Clarkson mode of slogans and stereotypes.
Admin  
#14 Posted : 22 July 2005 12:47:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Allan St.John Holt Well, Kiernan, you're not debating yourself, rather stating a position. I did put 'spy' in quotes, because that's what people have described it to me as feeling like, though I agree it's an emotive word which does not describe the process well. But I would argue that I have seen no evidence that BS practitioners are aware of some of the ethical concerns. I know personally at least six large employers who have taken to a BS approach precisely because their beliefs are confirmed that if only people were more careful and 'behaved properly' there wouldn't be any accidents. My intention was to supply an answer to Lumpy's question, which was to ask why unions in his experience are hostile to the concept. I wasn't attempting to debate the merits or otherwise of the BS approach, which of course has its plus points as well, but overall I think the acronym is quite apt... Personal views only, of course. Allan
Admin  
#15 Posted : 22 July 2005 14:24:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Clinton I have been working with one of the biggest multi disciplined construction companies on a major project that has employed, for some time now, the behavioural safety approach right across its divisions and have put nearly 100% (will be achived very soon!) of the office and opperative staff (almost 10,000) through either the 2 day or 4 day IOSH course and the CEO of the company takes a very personal and active interest in his staffs views and understanding of H&S. Let me assure any doubters out there that this company is where it is today because of this approach - it does work!!
Admin  
#16 Posted : 22 July 2005 16:16:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Merv Newman I've just read the "hazards" article and am rather disappointed that the authors have taken such an odd position. They appear to believe that "BS" is being substituted for the "usual mission of the occupational safety professional - identifying and taking measures to remedy hazards by elimination, substitution, investment in new safety plant, introducing engineering controls, product modification, hiring of more staff, introducing better, more worker-friendly work organisation or other measures to make the job, the whole workplace, better and safer" If this were the case, then I would be more in agreement with them. However, in our experience, it is not so. As a consultant I started with Safety Management Systems (SMS) and my "usual mission" was defined exactly as above. The only BS I knew about at the time was the Dupont STOP programme. (more on that later) About 10 years ago I got interested in BS, studied up, got trained by one of the experts and, with his backing started offering BS as a "next step" to our SMS clients. Eventually after a successful 2-year SMS project one client started BS as an add-on to existing programs and systems. That is, I strongly believe, the only way to approach the subject. Research has shown (I can send you a copy of the paper) that there are three main areas involved in building a safety culture ; a) the phsical work environment, b) the management of safety, c) the human factor. The interactions between these three areas are so strong and frequent that no one or two of those areas can be treated separately. They should all be treated simultaneously preferably on the continuous improvement spiral. The "usual mission" defined above appears only to take into consideration the first two of these areas. The article takes time to denigrate the theory that 80-90% of accidents are caused by unsafe acts. Fine. I don't like that theory either. However I would be more inclined to say that a "human factor" can be found, amongst causes related to the work environment and to management failures, in 80 to 90% of accidents. BS programs generally work to alter the actual or perceived consequences of certain behaviours. Those consequences can be negative or positive (punishment is a negative consequence). Negative consequences for unsafe behaviour - a fine for speeding - are very inefficient unless their probability and importance are reinforced. Which is why we see so many speed cameras around and why the fines get higher and higher (and people still excede the limits) Ensuring positive consequences for good, safe behaviour is much more efficient and long lasting. People look for the smile or a few words of praise, confirmation that the way they are behaving is appreciated by their colleagues and by management. Unfortunately the average manager knows only how to criticise and to punish unsafe behaviour. They do not know how to praise and reward, and therefore reinforce, safe behaviour. A typical manager will walk straight past a "safe" worker in order to spend some of his valuable time with someone not wearing an item of PPE. And what happens when the manager turns his back ? Off comes the PPE. The worker who has made that little extra effort to be safe is ignored. Even people who are, say, 95% correct will find themselves jumped on because of the odd 5% and no mention will be made of the 95% Tell me, if your wife/husband/significant other/mother had made a real effort to prepare a pretty good meal, what would happen if all you could do was criticise it as not being up to the standards achieved by your previous wife/husband/significant other/mother Unions, when they hear the words BS, tend to think immediately of "spying and looking for someone to punish". Certainly in some of the older BS programs this is exactly the methodology. Supervisors are actually given a weekly quota of "tickets" to complete, reporting infractions or dangerous behaviours. In response to these BS programs people adopt pre-defined safe behaviours for fear of the negative consequences. Or else. Many other BS programs go the other way : Employees are involved in defining safe behaviours (see my previous posting on this thread). Positive consequences - praise, thanks, rewards are obtained by groups which meet their own improvement targets. The safe behaviours are adopted because people want to obtain praise thanks and rewards. (and I'm not talking cash here) The latter programs are more successful and user-friendly as there is an enormous difference between what we do as a minimum to avoid negative consequences and what we can do if we really want to. I could go on all day about this (and I do, quite often)
Admin  
#17 Posted : 24 July 2005 23:43:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Raymond Rapp As a doubter of BS (St John Holt's side) it is quite clear from the postings, that if BS is implemented 'fairly' then it can have a positive effect. Providing the limitations or the negative aspects are properly considered, such as the under reporting of incidents. However, all too often BS principles are used as a substitute for proper and effective control measures. In my experience the real problem does not lie with h&s practitioners, but the operational managers who are often overseeing the practice of BS or management of safety. Many managers think that safety can be managed by a meaningless string of KPIs. Incidentally, the example I originally pointed out in Hazards magazine was to illustrate the 'alternative' view and not that it is necessarilly correct. The other point I would like to make, is that very few people appear to have a sound knowledge of the causation of accidents. Hence there is often too much emphasis on 'active errors' as opposed to 'latent errors'. The notion that 70%, 80% or any other percentage of accidents are caused by human error is a nonsense, as there is not a scrap of reliable evidence to support it. Ok, off my soap box...for now. Ray
Admin  
#18 Posted : 25 July 2005 09:32:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Merv Newman Ray, thankyou. I am delighted to see that you are in total agreement with my point of view. Merv
Admin  
#19 Posted : 25 July 2005 09:51:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By john fitzgibbon Kieran, I can only speak from my personal experience however narrow or broad that happens to be. My latest experience of BS is working at an oil/gas module construction yard for a contractor. The client, a world class oil company, introduced a BS programme via a UK based consultancy. The problems are the contrasts and conflicts between the high spend talk-shop world of the client/consultant approach and the reality of the under-resourced make-do-and-mend of the contractor's. The shop-floor, where most of the serious hazards reside, become cynical about BS and the perceived less well-resourced efforts of their own "employer". This tends to devalue and negate any benefits of a well intentioned programme. A more general problem is, in my opinion, endemic to the UK. It is the willingness to report a broken ladder versus the unwillingness to "snitch" or challenge unsafe behaviour. Thus the output from the programme here was an endless stream of broken ladder "cards". Our shop-floor is employed via an agency when employment status is at best only virtual. This feeling of being a temporary worker has further reduced buy-in and proves a difficult concept for the text book, naieve approach of the suits from the consultancies in this case hired in by the client. I hope I dont sound like Jeremy Clarkson.
Admin  
#20 Posted : 25 July 2005 10:11:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Kieran J Duignan In relation to the question initially posed by 'Lumpy', available evidence indicates that 'behavioural safety' can be very cost-effective to manage many kinds of hazard if, and only if, sufficient conditions are created to make it work. In relation to Raymond's observations, the development of the CIRAS programme at Strathclyde University was designed to address the problems he refers to, both by relevant research and by educating the managers to function more flexibly and get to grips with latent errors. While CIRAS works on the principle of confidentiality, the pragmatic methodology involved is evaluated in 'Safety Management: A Qualitative Systems Approach', J Davies et al., Taylor and Francis, 2003. As the critical difficulty appears to lie in creating conditions which make genuine behavioural safety possible, I wonder to what extent this discussion may indicate the value of a half-day workshop about constructing the basis for a pilot behavioural safety programme in the kind of environment 'Lumpy' and many others work in.
Admin  
#21 Posted : 25 July 2005 19:22:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Raymond Rapp Merv I am not sure that I am in 'total agreement' with you as I must confess I have only skimmed your latest 'war and peace' posting (not much work across the Channel?). I also suspect that you have said this 'tongue in cheek' in order to solicit a response. Kieran on the other hand has introduced an interesting twist by referring to CIRAS, which is the railway industry confidential reporting system. However, I think the success or otherwise of CIRAS in relation to BS is at best tenious. Largely because many of the incidents that are reported have nothing to do with individuals or BS. Rather they are typical of 'latent errors' that are often 'triggered' by individual(s) actions. I do agree with Kieran that more research is needed in BS and the causation of accidents. Perhaps those respected bodies associated with safety may like to take up the initiative. My final provocative thought on the subject is as follows: if...BS is so successful in reducing workplace accidents, where does this leave the HSEs recent announcement that 40% of accidents are directly linked to poor design. Regards Ray
Admin  
#22 Posted : 26 July 2005 08:45:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Merv Newman Ray, quite right, it's the vacation period - nothing to do until the end of august. I can agree with the hse assertion that 40% of accidents are directly linked to "design" problems. But there is never a sole unique cause of an accident. Latent errors such as design or management problems are quite often "triggered" by human behaviour. Thus the three main areas of accident causes ; design or work environment, systematic failures and human behaviours can be found to be implicated simultaneously in the great majority of accidents (80% anyone ?). Occasionally, I feel, only two of these factors may be implicated. Rarely, if never, I feel, is there a sole unique cause of an accident. So, as said above, we need to deal with all of the three areas of injury causes simultaneoulsy. And that includes BS. Now to mow the lawns.
Admin  
#23 Posted : 26 July 2005 09:03:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Kieran J Duignan In relation to the 'at best tenuous' link between CIRAS and Behavioural Safety, like Reason's contributions about latent error, they represent an enormous shift in safety managment. This is the recognition that psychology influences practice by management and unions by setting the parameters of safety systems (as well as behaviour of individuals and groups) and contributes to design of work and the work environment. It may take another generation to mature, but it's happening gradually as research clarifies how some allegedly 'tenuous' links critically determine management behaviour. CIRAS is an instance of this as much of its operation is confidential, and enorlous care has to be taken about what can be published and how - hence the significance of the title by Davies et al. They indicate clearly and in considerable detail how links between safety sytems, behavioural safety are rooted in psychology and philosophy, which are not yet mainstream in safety management practice in the UK. Collaboration with non-English speaking EU partners may well require attention to such matters for practical purposes.
Admin  
#24 Posted : 26 July 2005 09:17:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Andy Petrie I attended a presentation last week on 'rule compliance' and attitude change. It is a research project that has been carried out by the RSSB (Rail Safety & Standards Board). It stressed that attitude change was vital in order to get people to comply with rules (wear your hard had, drive at the speed limit, follow the procedure etc.) It is a longer term process than BS but gives better results. The report is to be published on the RSSB website in the next few weeks so look out for it.
Admin  
#25 Posted : 26 July 2005 10:47:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Robert K Lewis Couple of things have stood out in the discussion on this thread. 1) Design and BS are not in my mind mutually exclusive. Designers are after all people acting or choosing to act in particular ways. Poor design is generally a consequence of failing to contemplate the design from the viewpoint of the constructor or end user. It is perceived as an exercise in a vacuum. 2) My second point is linked to this in the sense that we need to break out of seeing BS purely in terms of the actions of people and their attitudes at the sharp end of actually doing a task. The current debates are far too centred around BS being a technique to ensure set rules are followed. It has to be much more than that, surely the ultimate aim is to bring about a recognition of the responsibility that we all carry for our own and for other people's safety both at work and at home. The current picture for BS is one which seeks, in my view, to ensure that rules are followed regardless or rules are understood and therefore are followed. I will go back to my old hobby horse of the educationist Freire. He describes three cultures the first 2 are the "banking of information" dependent culture and the independent "user of pre-given information" culture. His final one is a culture of full concsientization where individuals are able to assess and plan on the basis of their internalised cultural norms which have been self set. This latter culture equates to the full interdependency that we so desparately seek and which is elusive without full committment at all levels of employee (inclusive of directors) Bob
Admin  
#26 Posted : 26 July 2005 14:30:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Patrick Connett Having carried out a quick review of the discusion, I have the following to offer based on my experience as a manager successfully implementing BS into a significant branch of a multi-national, and more recently as an independent consultant. Unfortunately, In my experience uninformed management often view Behavioural Safety programs as the universal panacea and want to short-cut the process to get results. Unless there are already active safety management systems and processes in place, behavioural safety will fall at the first hurdle, as BS is a progression of a continuum, not an alternative system. Before introducing BS, the company culture must be ready for it. As a minumum, there must be a culture of open and honest dialogue, a no-blame culture (failures are learning opportunities), and management must be prepared to spend money to correct those conditions which trigger bad behaviour. Unless these three basic conditions are met, failure is assured. When I initially introduced BS in 1999, I used a diagonal slice team of volunteers from across the organisation. I made it clear that I was just another member of that team and acted as more of a coach - the team made the big decisions. We engaged everyone in the organisation to ensure they knew what BS was all about and would be expected of people. We gave everyone a short seminar on the reason for feedback, and on how to receive feedback in a non-defensive manner. We trained observers to give feedback in a constructive and non-judgemental manner. Anyone who came onto the site was also given a short introduction. We went through the 'spy' scenario at first, but the way the interventions are made is the key. Fully engaging the other person and getting their point of view is essential. You don't have to be an expert in a process to be able to discuss the behaviours involved - you just need to be able to ask the right questions. By the time I left the organisation at the end of 2003, BS had taken on a life of its own, with everyone giving everyone else both positive and negative feedback on their behaviour. This happened at all levels, from shop floor upwards. We created a culture in which people felt they had a right, and were expected to give feedback (in effect a 'brother's keeper' culture). The consequence was undoubtably an improved safety performance. So where are the main pitfalls? BS is a high maintenance intervention - it has to be on the agenda at every meeting in the organisation. Metrics have to be published regularly - what gets measured is important to the organisation. Things which trigger negative behaviours must be identified and must get fixed (and they cost money)! Behaviour change does not happen overnight - constant coaching has to be performed until the desired results are met. As Safety Behavioural change measurement is a leading indicator it is hard to convince the sceptics that safety performance is improving as a direct result of the intervention.
Admin  
#27 Posted : 26 July 2005 18:34:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Raymond Rapp A very good example of the complexities of BS has been posted by Robert. However, there have been many examples of 'people following the rules'. What about these rules? Are they easy to follow, practicable and applied consistently? In my experience working in a safety critical industry, the rules are often incongruous to the wider concept of good safety. Very often rules are written as a 'knee jerk' reaction to an accident. Managers often transgress them when it suits their purpose (permitted violations), often the appropriate rule does not fully protect an individual scenario and worst, they are often impracticable to implement. But they do often insulate those who wish to be protected - management! Merv - how is the garden keeping? Ray
Admin  
#28 Posted : 27 July 2005 08:40:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Merv Newman Rules, good bad or indifferent, enforced, respected, understood or whatever form only one part of the "management" of safety, weaknesses in which are one of the three major sources of accidents. while we are on the subject of rules, and procedures, there are, again, three significant categories of rules and procedures : 1. Archeological - covered in layers of dust and dirt, haven't seen the light of day for years. Requests to consult them result in lengthy digging in remote unpopulated areas. (time team could be useful here) 2. Virgin - untouched by the hand of man. (with apologies to any male secretaries out there) - designed by a committee, typed, copied and distributed by a secretary, received and immediately filed unread by another secretary. 3. Time-worn - covered in dirty fingerprints and coffee stains, heavily creased, probably incomplete and out-of-date. These will be the only procedures known to employees and probably followed by them. Got the lawns cut yesterday. Had time for a glass of chilled rosé on the terrace. (it's the wrong season for G&T) Cheers, Merv
Admin  
#29 Posted : 27 July 2005 15:26:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Robert K Lewis Merv Totally agree that rules are only part of the issue. The breakdown is around 4% equipment, 4% rules and procedures and 92% people isn't it. But BS is being pushed, happily or unhappily into the corner of maintaining rules by changing attitudes towards them. This will not ultimately reduce accidents to the mystical near zero that we so ardently desire. There is a real need to open up the BS horizon but the real problem then becomes that the HSE say we are relying on the training and competency of our employees to avoid injury. We need to have detailed specific risk assessments which foresee every possible failure event and provide the correct response option. Dynamic risk assessment to them is a notion that is a detailed written assessment when you need one. The current HSE conducted debate site on sensible risk assessment shows much of this thinking. From my position I also see the HSE even saying that the industry recognised codes, which they support, are not adequate if they so feel the need. Bob
Admin  
#30 Posted : 27 July 2005 16:13:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Merv Newman 4%, 4%, 92% ? No, No, No ! "in 80% of accidents causes are found which are linked to the work environment. In 80% of accidents causes are found which are linked to management failures. In 80% of accidents causes are found which are linked to human behaviour" Thus for the great majority of accidents there are multiple causes. "Change attitudes so as to change behaviours ?" No, no, no ! An article in the HSP some years (1998 ?) ago quoted a nationwide publicity campaign in the UK building industry to change attitudes to safety. Apparantly the injury rates after the campaign were higher than before. I understand (can't quote the sources) that research has shown that attitude change is an internal thing and is little influenced by outside influences. In any case attitudes are extremely difficult to measure reliably. However, behavioural changes can be changed by external influences and can be observed and measured. Also, when a person has changed their behavioural habits they find internal justification for having done that. That internal justification eventually results in an attitude change to the behaviour. There are none more assiduous than the recent convert.
Admin  
#31 Posted : 28 July 2005 09:21:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Robert K Lewis Merv I think we are talking at cross purposes. Your 80:80:80 ratios necessarily includes peoples actions in most of them. I have no doubt that there are multiple causations to most accidents, Hale and Hale still rule OK, but it is how we approach the problem that is the issue and not how the cake is cut. I too have yet to find a single root cause for an accident but that does not mean necessarily that people do not sit behind many different causes. After all what do we actually mean when we say 80% are caused by work environment? Who creates the environment? I was also stressing the fact that many behavioural programmes have become a means for rule adherence rather than internalised change within the individual. It is this factor alone which has created much of the resistance to BS as a concept. But like all concepts we each need to find the ways in which we as individuals can make it work best in the context of the matter in hand at the time. By the way I am a great advocate of reader centred response so whatever you might say to me I feel free to understand it in my own terms and am never troubled by criticism of my approach. I will listen, digest, learn with others and find my own best solutions in a true spirit of the fully conscientized person. Bob (I think)
Admin  
#32 Posted : 28 July 2005 12:06:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Lumpy Wow ... who would have though that one posting would have prompted so much debate. For me the positives have won, and I will be investigating BS in more detail..... but to compliment our existing systems rather than the be all and end all. Lumpy
Admin  
#33 Posted : 28 July 2005 13:05:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Patrick Connett Hey guys I think Merv and Bob are both talking the same statistics from different angles. Research in the 90's showed that 96% of injuries were a result of unsafe behaviours and 4% a result of unsafe conditions. However, the 4% includes conditions created by other people's acts or omissions (behaviours). The important thing to remember is that there is always a cause or trigger for unsafe behaviour, whether it be lack of time, lack of resource, bad practice, incompetence or inappropriate procedures. For this reason, the workforce need to be fully engaged in BS - they're the one's doing the job and know what goes on. These triggers (the Americans call these antecedents) need to be flushed out and rectified - and rectification is the job for management. This is where most BS interventions fail, either the antecedents are not identified or they are not rectified. Don't forget that management are part of the workforce too - they need to set the examples, be part of it and facilitate change. You will only ever get the the behaviours which management exhibit themselves. "Don't do as I do, do as I say" is not an option with BS! With regard to attitudes versus behaviours, most research says there are more than 15 different items that contribute to attitude (most of them psychological), so it's much easier to identify behaviours and change them. After all, you can see a behaviour happen, you can only assume an attitude as it's a state of mind. Pat
Admin  
#34 Posted : 28 July 2005 15:45:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Robert K Lewis As I said the cake can be cut many ways, depending on where you start. My reasons for doing it the way I do is because they are essentially the functioning items of any culture People Laws and regulations and codes Tools and things used The final central hub around which they all revolve is the leadership, which is what tries to keep it all turning in the appropriate direction. As two items are inanimate it is left to the people who have a choice to try and "antagonise", in a technical sense, the whole system in order to challenge the accepted leaders path. As I say we all have to find our own approach based on the principles of change. What my cut says is that by concentrating on people I can bring about the largest benefit in accident reduction. Even with perfection in the other two areas 92% of accidents are theoretically likely to occur. There is some spillover however and attacking the other two will heighten awareness and bring some change in people, probably about a 30 - 50 % figure on previous experience, but not the 90%+ that we really need. Bob
Admin  
#35 Posted : 28 July 2005 16:19:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By el nino All, I was recently at a BS training session in darkest Europe. This was with a leading BS consultant. A member of the audience asked some thing along the lines of " What should I do with my machine, it has moving parts and someone might put their hand in - should I fit a guard?" The trainer responded by saying that "no, we can't be expected to spend all of our profits on guarding. we need to teach our people to take more care by using XXXBS system". When BS systems are sold in this way I am not suprised to see that the unions take a negative view. El Nino
Admin  
#36 Posted : 28 July 2005 18:08:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Merv Newman Bob, Patrick, I think that we are all in pretty good agreement. No more arguments from me. El nino, I have previously met up with a BS organisation which "trains trainers". Often people straight out of university who can't get a proper job. (one of our ex prime ministers went to mckinsey on the same basis. Look what happened to him !) Obviously they only train them to present the BS part of safety and, as they have never lived in the real world they are going to take their employer's word for it that BS is the one and only way to do it. Did you actually get your money back ? If you are still looking at BS despite the negative comments, I have three books on my shelf which you might like to look at : Aubrey C Daniels "bringing out the best in people" Terry McSween, "The values based Safety Process" Dominic Cooper, " Improving Safety Culture" You can probably get them through amazon Merv
Admin  
#37 Posted : 29 July 2005 13:32:00(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Admin

Posted By Jonathan Sandler Perceptions of risk can be raised so that people do feel the need for improved personal safety. This can be achieved by helping people to learn from the experiences of others, e.g. communicating information about accidents resulting from unsafe behaviour. People are usually highly motivated by personal growth and development. Participation and involvement in safety improvement can therefore provide motivation, there are, therefore, a number of things that organisations can do to motivate employees to adopt safe working practices: Raise perceptions of risk by involving all employees in risk assessment and communicating information about accidents, etc ensure adequate standards to clarify what behaviour is required make commitment to safety at the highest levels very clear ensure that monitoring for compliance with safe working practices is visible consistently deter unsafe behaviour and comment on safe behaviour provide frequent feedback on performance deal with any obstacles that make it difficult to work in a safe manner involve all employees in the safety improvement and monitoring process take advantage of all situations when individuals might be influenced, e.g. induction training, promotion, performance review following an accident. It has been shown that almost all of the factors that influence behaviour is, to some extent, within the control of the organisation and its management system. Conclusion There is no single route to promoting safe behaviour, but there are six approaches that can be used simultaneously: Example, senior managers must set a good example and always follow the rules, procedures and safe systems of work that exist. This reinforces the need for all employees to do the same, failure to do so devalues the standards and procedures that exist. Compelling, clear responsibilities, accountabilities and standards of performance that are consistently applied. The perceived risk of disciplinary action can be greater than the perceived risk of injury. Rewarding, reward systems based on reducing the number of reported injuries can have a negative effect; discouraging employees from reporting accidents. Reward schemes based on compliance with performance standards might be more beneficial. Simply recognising and commenting on safe behaviour can help. Facilitating, making safe behaviour easy and removing obstacles, e.g. ensuring that adequate waste bins are provided to allow employees to dispose of rubbish easily. Informing, raising employees' understanding of the reasoning behind precautions and performance standards. Training, developing competence, influencing attitudes and reducing the risk of mistakes. Both the employer and employees will learn from their own experiences and it is in the nature of risk that unsafe behaviour does not always result in injury. Unfortunately, unsafe practices are reinforced every time we "get away with it".
Users browsing this topic
Guest
You cannot post new topics in this forum.
You cannot reply to topics in this forum.
You cannot delete your posts in this forum.
You cannot edit your posts in this forum.
You cannot create polls in this forum.
You cannot vote in polls in this forum.