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Posted By CAG
So out of interest does anyone have any ideas on why the unfortunate incident happened? I know the full details will not be known until the incident has been fully investigated but I would be interested to know if the blast was contained and if safe systems were followed.
Any ideas anyone? I also wish the press would pick up on good things about health and safety and report these things to the general public.
Page 5 of The Express brought a smile to my face – the mask being worn by the police officer…
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Posted By Mark Talbot
It may be interesting to postulate on reasons and causes, but quite impossible, and improper at this stage beyond fuel + ignition.
If we want good press, we should not join the media in trying to second-guess accidents without facts.
Reading that sentence above seems as though I am being harsh - I don't mean to sound harsh, but I trust you to read it as a debate rather than a rebuke.
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Posted By Jonathan Sandler
I agree with Mark, well said, any safety person who has been involved in a disaster or death knows what its like when others second guess.
If and when possible the prelim report will be released, the question will be, will hse take the lead on this one?
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Posted By Robert K Lewis
Caught a strange conversation on R4 at lunchtime. I may have missed something but the spokesperson seemed to imply they are in discussion with the HSE to see whether it was just an accident or whether HSE would be investigating!
Can someone correct my hearing or was I right?
!!!
Bob
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Posted By CAG
Ok maybe my question was wrong, it wasn’t meant to speculate about what happened but having just studied other incidents such as Bophal, Flixborough, Hicks and Welsh etc. I was just interested that’s all.
I do think your comments were a bit harsh after all it is a discussion forum, I notice there is another thread so obviously there are some views out there. As long as we learn from these incidents then I don’t see the problem with talking about them, sharing views etc after all that is how we learn and improve our systems.
I would now like to close this thread and forget I had ever posted it.
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Posted By Robert K Lewis
CAG
This applies equally to the similar thread but chose yours to encourage the seeking mind and reduce the disheartenment.
The lessons out of Flixboro may have been learned once but Trevor Kletz pointed out that the corporate memory is finite and the most bitter lessons will ultimately be forgotten. So I suspect that we will find ultimately some simple errors concerning plant modification or maintenance at the root of the failures. When will the lesson that changes are amongst the most risky activities performed on a chemical facility, or any other enterprise for that matter. It is however the aspect that is least well risk assessed and managed - only the ILO safety management system clearly flags it as an issue for control.
Equally one has to query the segregation and automatic block valve scenario. Conocophilips at least isolated the event into a specific zone, the whole refinery did not become involved. We will doubtless see assessments that reduced the risks because it was a storage only facility.
The claims that Nypro is now the second largest peacetime explosion like everything journalistic I treat with caution as I am not convinced that a vapour cloud explosion of circa 200tonnes of cyclohexane is smaller that the rapid deflagration of storage facilities with several million barrels of fuel present. But what is clear is that no fire water run off assessment seems to have been done as the EA was delaying foam use until the assessment had been done. I have campaigned hard on this latter issue but there are few organisations who pay regard to the problem during a new build project. I am afraid the "it will never happen to us" syndrome still rules.
Bob
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Posted By J Knight
Surely one of the things which can be said right now is about COMAH and the siting of these things. We have a paradoxical situation where a site such as a large refinery could not now be built in the kind of built-up location where Buncefield depot was, even though we now know a greta deal about designing sites with a reasonable degree of built-in safety, while sites which have been around for years and were not so well designed are all over the place. Maybe a change is needed in law to de-register the most dangerous sites, to make COMAH fully retrospective? Drastic, yes; a burden on business, well, yes, but imagine what the outcome of the explosion might have been if it had happened at 08:45 this morning; we could be talking about hundreds of dead,
John
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Posted By TBC
Nice one John - I'm with you. I believe that the authorities and all the experts are involved in the disaster planning of any site. -
But it comes down to money - reduced costs on maitenance and manpower etc !!!!!!!!!!
How hard does anyone have to push H&S in their company?
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Posted By Aidan Toner
I dont intend to speculate how this fire may have started.I would simply point out that the western world is now obliged to move into a new era with regards to news management concerning sites of high risk or national economic importance.The ability to be honest and open about mal events is obliged to be even more curtailed by securocrats.All I do know is that there is presently a singular media theme with respect to possible cause ie accident.To repeat,I,m not offering any possible cause but Im concerned at the present media approach..
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Posted By Ken Taylor
Having previously been involved in Emergency Planning and having enquired into the planned emergency procedures for some major sites, I have been concerned that 'worse case scenario' has not always seemed to be the basis for risk assessment - with a response received to the effect that this would be so unlikely that it would not be reasonably practicable to plan for it. The increasingly uncertain environment would tend to emphasise a need for some rethinking and upgraded planning in some areas.
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Posted By Jim Walker
John,
In my distant past, I used to visit a business close to this depot.
I can confirm it was once well out in the sticks -housing & trading estates
have gradually crept closer!
Lessons to be learned here for planning bodies too.
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Posted By john fitzgibbon
Simply put, this is now a major, major incident because it occurred at a facility that clearly could not cope with a major fire primarily because of its scale and the quantities and storage configuration of highly volatile products.
Another watershed for the Oil Industry and risk management science?
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Posted By Alison Melrose
I'm sure I read there was planning permission for a further 10,000 houses to be erected in the area within the next few years..I hope that the planners think long and hard before any building work is carried out close to the site (or any sites around the UK with similar facilities).
Living close to BP Grangemouth (across the Forth), I dread to think what the effect would be if there was a Major incident there...wouldn't be hanging out a washing for a few days anyway!!
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Posted By Simon Heesom
Bet I know what the June 06, Dip 2 case study will be!
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Posted By Merv Newman
Which came first ? Buncefield or the housing ?
I worked for about 16 years within a mile of Buncefield - Maylands avenue, Hemel Hempstead. At the time Buncefield was surrounded by green fields. Since then (partly I think because it had such an excellent safety record - never an incident that I heard of (and it was on our "snowball" incident alert system)) it was turned into a business park. Housing, when I left the area was no nearer than a mile from the site. (Leverstock Green)
At the time, up to 1982, our disaster planning included the possibility of a major incident at Buncefield or on the nearby M1. We had plans to relocate to Stevenage where all of our backup records and computer files were kept.
I do not yet know if there is any damage to the building we used at the time (western end of Maylands avenue) but I think we were fairly well prepared for the eventuality. OK, that was almost 25 years ago. I hope my successors kept the emergency plans up-to-date.
A similar incident occurred in France two years ago when a fertilizer plant blew up. Originally an out of town site it had gradually become surrounded by the town. Considerable loss of life and an extraordinary amount of damage to businesses and property.
Again, I audited a paint plant some years ago (road white lining) which had been green field but became gradually surrounded by the town, including a school) In that plant there were so many safety weaknesses and possibilities for disaster that I advised them to shut down production and re-build elswhere. Fortunately they did just that, investing in modern plant and equipment and achieving considerable economies in production. (I still want to improve safety glasses wearing however)
Is this a common problem ? Are COMAH or SEVESSO plants being built away from habited zones and then, after some years, being encroached by habitations or other business ? Perhaps planning rules need to be tightened.
How does one define an acceptable "exclusion zone" ? Perhaps an examination of the Buncefield damage zone will assist at arriving at a suitable distance within which one should not accept construction of business premises or housing. I cannot at the moment remember details of the Richter earthquake scale, which is mainly based on levels of damage to buildings but at what distance from the Buncefield detonation point were Richter levels of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, ... identified (too early to ask this question of course)
How close would you accept to live to a COMAH site ? Possible level 2 or 3 ? And how much would you pay for a Barrats 2-up, 2-down in a zone 4 ?
And should an estate agent be legally bound to disclose this information to you ?
Discuss
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Posted By David Raymond
Interesting Merv, I lived in Hemel for 25 years and only moved away in the last few years to West Hertfordshire. I owned a small house in an area called Hales Park, this was a relatvely new development (5-10 years old) and this is behind Maylands Avenue backing onto Buncefield. I've spoke to a friend who still lives there, and apparently the whole development has been badly damaged with remarkably very few injuries. Where was the planning for this development?
When watching the BBC reports alot of the camera shots were taken for Cherry Trees Lane, not far from where I worked at Dexion. But this next door to the DuPont chemical and paint site, which houses an array of chemicals that need no ignition to explode. Apparently the buidling has also been badly damaged.
Over the years the industrial area has slowly surrounded Buncefield, with a new development built in the last 7 years with the 3Com building and warehouses nextdoor to the deopt. How were they allowed to build so close?
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Posted By AlB
Tha main thing we need to learn from the Bouncefield Depot incident is that no more can we say that the worst case scenario is impossible to plan for as it is so remote. Nearly the worst incident that could have happened ther has happened, thankfully with remarkably low casualty numbers, so now we need to consider that worst case scenarios always need to be planned for, because there is a probability of it occurring.
The fire service did a great job in controlling the fire, but the reports that they were underprepared and lacked training in dealing with such an incident is worrying in that this should have been high on their major accident lists. But on the other hand they responded well, overcame difficulties and used their training and ingenuity to tackle what was a very, very dangerous situation.
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Posted By fats van den raad
Ironically, when these kind of places do get built with a "buffer zone" that would provide relative safety to houses, etc due to the distance from the potential source provided by the buffer zone, it was not originally planned that way because of safety considerations. A good example can be found at a very large (2 factories actually) petrochemical site in South Africa. There is an open stretch of field of more than a mile (called the secondary area) between the factory itself and the nearest houses. This area however had not been created because of concerns about the safety of inhabitants, should the worst happens.... this are was created purely on the grounds of security!!
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Posted By George Wedgwood Yes, the HSE will be investigating this 'Major Accident' at the Buncefield Oil terminal - see their Website entry at http://www.hse.gov.uk/buncefield.htmOne of the key control measures is normally to have a fire protection system to safely control 'rim fires', which can start occasionally for a simple reason (lightning, static etc.). However, if vapour is assessed as possible to be released in a cloud, then tanks proximity must be a significant design feature at the Watts/metre from a 'pool fire' will determine the radiated heat to reach the next tank (and fire pipes). Clearly at Buncefield this was inadequate! For explosively projected fire instigators, rim fires should be the worst case and if the fire protection had been installed (with pipes shielded from heat radiation) they could have been extinguished. I await the ultimate HSE Report but I suppose that will take well over three years like the explosion and fire at ConocoPhillips Limited’s Humber Refinery on 16 April 2001!
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Posted By J Knight
Interesting points about planning laws and how residential property moved in to the area after the place was already operating; how many of us actually know how many COMAH sites there are in our oen areas?
John
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Posted By Ian Waldram
Of course all our views are speculation at this stage, as others have said. However, here are a couple of general points:
- Rim fires (George Wedgewood): these occur ony on floating-roof tanks, I think we'll find in due course that most of these were fixed roof. The choice depends on what product you are storing, and how large the quantifty. For fixed roof, the advantage of no rim seal is offset by the need to inert the free space as the level falls, or else a flammable mixture is formed;
- Planning distances: these are set by HSE for all COMAH sites, including Buncefield I'm sure. There would normally be an 'exclusion zone', and a 'consultation zone'. They then advise what types of development should be permitted in the latter, based on occupancy and vulnerability of occupants (a higher risk is allowed for fit adults than for older people and children), and have to be consulted about each specific Planning Application in that zone. One problem is that the Local Planning Authority can ignore HSE advice - those who want developments to go ahead are always eager to cite examples from elsewhere, and of course the Local Authority increases its income by allowing property developments on otherwise 'sterile land'. Canvey Island was a notorious example where several housing developments went to appeal with HSE and the COMAH site operator(s) objecting and the Local Authority pressing for the new housing. No doubt we will find out in due course what was the case at Buncefield. It's also worth recalling that for Mexico City (propane/butane) and Bhopal many hundreds were killed in areas where slum husing had encroached into the 'exclusion zone' - because there were no effective planning controls. COMAH site Safety Reports (Cases) are not confidential, and certainly the local population can ask about the expected 'worst case' events and what areas are predicted to be affected. No doubt this too will be a subject of much detailed review and debate as the Buncefield facts become clearer.
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Posted By Nigel Hammond
Just received this email;
Police have admitted that George Best was not buried in Belfast last week, and in retrospect, the decision to cremate him in Hemel Hempstead on Sunday morning might have been a mistake.
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Posted By Stuart Nagle
Merv.
So far as I am aware - I was born in Abbotts Langley and spent a fair amount of
time in and around Hemel - Buncefield was post the council housing that was mainly erected
in the late 1950's and early 1960's when Hemel was the 'model' new town.
Leverstock Green, as you point out was about a mile away, but at that time only
a few cottages existed at the northern end of the village, and it was there long, long before
buncefield. Maylands Avenue industrial estate however grew up in the late 1960's
and early 1970's but mushroomed in the 1980's and is still growing now (or was).
As has been stated above, I don;t believe there has been a previous incident at this site
since it was commisioned (that has been reported anyway) and the site was, with the exceptio of pcketing
at some time, never in the news.
At a point of interest, my sister-in-law lives about 2 miles from the site just off the main road
going toward the 'magic roundabout' at the bottom of the hill. She was awoken by the blast
at about 6.00 am on the day and even at this distance their loft hatch was blown in
and they alsop lost some guttering and a few roof tiles!! Apart from that, fortunately, no other damage of injuries.
No doubt we shall, in the fullness of time discover what happened...
Stuart
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Posted By ian milne
Hey guys, check back in 4 years time when the HSE release their report findings after the investigation or court case. Well, that was what usually happens isn't it for these type of 'large scale' accidents. Then we can debate and compare the 'similar' findings to previous accidents...bhopal....glasgow plastics....piper etc.
Saying that, the recent speed of the Transco verdict was a shock to the system, so soon, so large, so much better. And, have they changed any of their practices since.......
Sarcastically yours
Ian
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Posted By Frank Hallett
I have read almost all of all the preceeding responses with interest and some care.
I think that it is definitely too early, with insufficient reliable information available, to make any form of specific pronouncement as to the cause [as in what were the underlying causal factors of the actual initiating event that set the incident off].
What is clear however, thanks to the overwhelming dissemination of consistant news reports, is that the assessments for the explosion zones could well prove to be suspect. There will be many different factors that have led to this; and I have no doubt that most parties will already be wriggling and squirming to minimise their apparent responsibility for this.
These are 2 different, although linked, issues and should not be discussed as if both were an integral part of the actual initiating event.
Frank Hallett
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Posted By Descarte
Having worked in the past at the conocophillips refinery starting not long after the incicent around easter time in 2001 I found the HSE report on the matter to be an enthrawling read, especially the bravery and expertise of the staff there and of the neighbouring Lindsey refinery.
It did interest me to find out that the Buncefield Oil Depot is owned primarily by Total who is supplied by ConocoPhillips and the actual humber refinery involved in 2001 via pipe line!? which must be nearly 200 miles long? Maybe I have been reading too much in the news papers.
Either way I am sure there will be an in-depth report by the HSE into both the incident (hampered by the fire reducing any clues left to its cause given the intense and prolonged heat) and the secondary issue of local planning applications.
Incidently the conoco 2001 accident happened on a bank holiday monday when around 1000 less people were on site and exactly at the time of shift change so few people were outside and now the Buncefield depot "disaster" happened at 06:00am with relatively few people in the vaccinity. Will we be so lucky next time? a chilling thought.
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Posted By Emma Forbes
I read in one of the national rags yesterday that the fat cats at Grangemouth are not optimistic about fighting a disaster, similar to Buncefield, if it were to happen. Many reasons were given, along with inadequate pipework that would more than likely collapse if a dose of water was applied to any fires......
Now that they're aware of it (which I'm sure they were before), I wonder what contingencies are in place now......
To the chap who stays nearby, SELL NOW!! My house in the beautiful Scottish Borders is still for sale....!
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Posted By Descarte
Breaking news?
Prohibition orders have been issued against two operators at the Buncefield oil depot site, following several explosions last week.
The decision was announced by Health and Safety Commission chairman Bill Callaghan ahead of a formal investigation into the blast.
Today 20/12 on BBC news website
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Posted By Lance Morgan
Two operators at Buncefield have been issued prohibition notices.
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Posted By Robert K Lewis
Be interesting to know how the HSE thinks the site could operate
Bob
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Posted By Robert K Lewis
Alternatively - Is it a correct use of a Prohibition Notice to stop clean up work. The securing of the area does not require such actions methinks.
The intention I think has deeper meaning and I leave it to others to identify what is truly happening here.
Bob
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Posted By Nigel Singleton BSc
I believe the HSE have issued 2 'no blame' prohibition notices, the intent of which is to maintain the scene of the accident until investigations have been completed, and no more.
Check out the BBC news web site.
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Posted By Bill Fisher
The intention of the Prohibition Notices is to enable HSE to control work on the Site, thus securing safety and evidence.
After considered planning and presentation for each task they will not hinder clean up nor investigation.
Bill
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Posted By John Murgatroyd
Same old HSE.
Mob handed after the event.
In five years time we'll be wading through a 2 thousand page report, 90% of which will be fudge.
But what the hell, at least the enquiry will guarantee loads of well paid work for the the worthless.
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Posted By Robert K Lewis
Nigel
No such animal as a no blame Prohibition Notice even though Justin McCracken seemed to think there was in his radio 4 interview yesterday evening. He even conned the BBC into believing that these were special and extraordinary powers that were being invoked - a politician would never have got away with such drivel because the reporters know their stuff, not so with H&S obviously - Read section 22 it is about the prevention of activities that are being undertaken or likely to be undertaken that pose IMMEDIATE/IMMINENT risk of serious injury or death.
The securing of an area to preserve evidence that might be lost in a clean up is about proper management systems not a blanket PN. All work with significant risk has to be properly assessed and it is not until then that the HSE can decide if there is imminent risk and not before. It does make you wonder how the mess is ever going to be removed - The demolition and investigation of Flixborough took place hand in hand with HSE and contractors so what is new now?
Bob
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