Posted By Dave Daniel
Interestingly, power press operation seems to be a rare event these days and few people are able to visualise the job.

From the HSE's press release, CovPress seem to have been operating a large single or double-action power press, probably one of several in a line, with a semi-automatic "iron hand" take-off mechanism for the panel in an interlocked enclosure at the rear of the press. This would have been typical motor industry practice, with the panel being dropped onto a conveyor for manually loading to the next press in the line, or automatically loaded on. Key operation was never utilised for such work, and the guards would all swing away for tool changing, along with the "iron hand".

The IP would have been immediately visible to the setter, who seems to have started up the press to do some setting at the same time, exposing the IP to risks of trapping in the press as well as movement of the "iron hand".

The guarding system would have been well recognised, understood and accepted by for example the old Joint Standing Committee on Power Presses set up by the Factory Inspectorate and latterly HSE.

Those who question interlocked guarding should realise that any system can be defeated readily easily, in this case by locking a man inside the enclosure. We also knew most setters could defeat Castell and Lowe & Fletcher captive key interlocks, apart from any interlock removal and electrical isolation. (in the case of castell keys, it was merely necessary to grind out the raised profile inside the key to make a "master"). Longbridge even had a thin guy who could "limbo-dance" through the vertical bars of some guarded enclosures......

It seems clear that the HSE took the view that the company had applied accepted safety techniques and procedures and the fault was solely that of the experienced press tool setter, so YES this is justice.

Dave Daniel - Group Safety Adviser - Rover Group 1976-87, Safety Adviser Pressed Steel Fisher/BL 1973-76

Posted By Martin Taylor
Ron

how do you describe the IN as 'almost identical circumstances' there is little to link the 2 cases other than a generic description (unless you have more details). The IN seems to describe an absence of a lockoff device and unsafe access to the control panel - not an unsafe SSOW for tool change

Martin

Posted By Mark Farrell
I want to chuck my 2 pence in here.
If you have all the usual safe systems in place, adequate training, supervision, then checks that the Safe systems work, the training is understood and regularly refreshed and there is an adequate level of supervision if a member of staff then decides to go against this why shouldnt they be prosecuted?

Posted By jom
Robert,

"This lack of straightforwardness bedevils many investigations and is the area in which the good investigators show their worth."

Well, that's an entirely different topic and worthwhile. Might be something in the forum archives on that.

J.

Posted By Tarquin Farquor
Ron,

Thanks for starting this thread, I've enjoyed and learn't from the subsequent debate.

Off now until next year, merry xmas.

TF