Posted By Arran Linton - Smith See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/...16_07_09_icl_inquiry.pdf

Posted By martinw I didn't comment or post anything, as other than what you said, what else is there to add? I could express how I feel about the HSE action/inaction but that is a common feeling, I believe; and I could express how horrific it must have been for all involved. To what end? I have to be honest but I had forgotten all about it; I suppose that my only thoughts are those of sadness for all involved, and I felt no useful purpose in sharing that with people who I do not know.

Posted By Pete48 FH, perhaps some of us are still studying the very long and comprehensive report rather than rushing into print here? As you say it is a complex accident with some significant lessons to learn I am sure. Give us a break, some of us have lives despite the myth. Boris did not require anymore than minute to read his blog

Posted By Al.. First, I commend the full report to all safety practitioners. It provides a detailed account of the circumstances over many years which led up to the tragedy and it can help us better understand how accidents like this can happen. Reading it is worthwhile CPD. Second, it is worth considering how many of us visiting the factory in a professional capacity would have picked up the buried pipe as a major problem to be addressed. This issue was not one which was regarded as a priority risk in the UK. It was not on our “radar”! The ambiguity in many people’s minds as to who has responsibility for an LPG installation downstream of the tank is at the root of it and this was not just confined to the ICL site. It is clear from the inquiry report that the uncertainty persists today in many small to medium organisations. It is interesting to read that a safety consultant who quoted for providing a safety advisory service to the company (but whose quote was not accepted) acknowledged to the inquiry that he would have assumed that the underground pipework was the responsibility of the tank supplier and he would not have included in his risk assessment for the factory. Lord Gill concluded that the current LPG safety regime in the UK is inadequate and he highlighted nine aspects of the current arrangements which give rise to significant risks. He recommended an action plan to address these matters. Jim Murphy, the Scottish Secretary speaking for the UK Government, said, the Government “fully accepts those recommendations, and will provide a full response to the report in January…..our main aim must be to see the introduction of a safety regime around LPG systems which is transparent, workable and enforceable." Lord Gill was critical of the HSE’s response following the tragedy with, five years on, no coherent action plan to deal with underground metallic pipework and the risk of a recurrence. He ascribes this inaction and the apparent lack of a sense of urgency on the part of the HSE to its assessment that the risk of a recurrence is remote. Mrs Sandra Caldwell from the HSE said as much in her evidence to the inquiry. Her comments on page 127 of the report are worth reading. And this, for me, gets us to the nub of the matter. Lord Gill’s remit required him to look only at the circumstances leading up to the tragedy and to make recommendations in the light of lessons learned. The HSE meanwhile looks at the risks of a recurrence of this type of incident in the context of the overall risks of gas-related incidents, the Government’s appetite for more health and safety regulation and the resources given to the HSE by Government to do its work. It would have been surprising if Lord Gill had concluded, as the HSE appeared to have done, that this was a tragedy but that in the overall context of things, the risk of this type of accident happening again remains low. He would have been accused of a whitewash. The Scottish Secretary has now asked the chair of the Health and Safety Executive to “report to Government within eight weeks, both to address the allegations of their serious failings in how they responded, and also to look at ways of strengthening the safety around liquid petroleum gas here and throughout the UK." It is always easy to be wise after the event. Public opinion now requires that something be done and time and effort will now be put into making sure that something is done. There will be a beefed up safety regime for LPG and everyone will feel more comfortable, and perhaps safer, as a result. But will it have been a proportionate response to the real risk? Who knows?... but I think that public opinion will not allow that debate.

Posted By Jim Tassell (2) Al Thanks for a considered initial reading of the report - you must have had a very slack Friday (or like PG and I you work in Glasgow and as it's Fair Friday...!) I think that the initial response from government needs to be carefully considered. It does seem to have aspects of knee-jerk about it, just as we are seeing for tower cranes. If your memory goes back far enough, isn't this starting to resemble the mish-mash of risk-specific legislation that we had under the Factories Act pre 1974? You know, the ones that Robens reckoned would only take five years to repeal! There is another discussion strand running today on the history of the HSW Act and I think history has some important, perhaps profound, lessons for the legislators. Robens' views are still valid today... aren't they? And does anyone recall what a Kier is and why they once had their own regulations? (Answers on some grey cloth to...)

Posted By Jim Tassell (2) Peter spot on! At least they aren't totally forgotten bits of kit. They were (are?) giant pressure cookers for bleaching cotton. The main risk was falling in as the lips were set low down for easy hand loading. And yes, my grandfather started work aged 12 as a kier boy loading and unloading them. Jim