I agree; when there's an incident of this scale the level of penalty should at least equal the cost to the emergency services, the environment agency and so on. Then there ought to be a penalty, and exemplary amount over and above cost recovery just to give other people & organisations the idea that this kind of incident is generally a bad thing and to be avoided. Fortunately (amazingly!!!) nobody actually died, but where deaths or serious injury are caused the penalty really does need to reflect this as well, John

Agreed, the level of fines are derisory given the seriousness of the event and failings. I can't understand why a recent cartel in the construction industry cost those involved £129 million, yet for safety failures it is a fraction of this cost? Nobody is going to take health and safety seriously until it hits them in the pocket hard.

Sorry guys but I think I disagree... On three grounds. Firstly - the "bang" only happened by a mechanism which has yet to be adequately explained. It was not foreseeable to site operaotors, HSE or anyone else (at the time) that the site could cause an explosion with the damaging consequnces seen. I don't think it would be fair to hold the companies liable for the scale of the explosion.. only for the scale of the leak and the (more likely) subsequent fire. (And the fire would have been less severe and easier to control if the leak had not gone bang and disrupted fire fighting efforts?) And ... secondly - I have seen nothing in any of the reports into the explosion which points to any serious / long term / criminal neglect or aversion to health and safety on the part of the companies accused. The things which went wrong were relatively "simple" low level; straightforward technical equipment, valve, alarm and design failures. Following BP Texas City, most inquiry was aimed at the Board level failings. Following Herald of Free Enterprise there was evidence of very senior disdain for safety. I have seen nothing to suggest that Buncefield was caused or conditions created by serious systemic senior level breaches of good H&S practice.... So I don't think the fines should be any higher than they are - indeed, I was actually surprised they were as high as they are. And thirdly - as I understand it, the level of any H&S fine is supposed to reflect the scale/seriousness/severity of the legislative breach, and not the scale of the consequences.... Civil damages may reflect the scale of the explosion, but criminal fines for failure to guard a machine should be the same whether someone has a finger pulled off or someone has a head pulled off... the breach is the same and the punishment should be the same. A large scale leak with alarm and control valve failure undoubtedly deserves punishment - but beyond that??? Sorry, and I'm probably out of step again, but I think the fines imposed were possibly a bit high - and the costs incurred / imposed seem ridiculously high. Steve

Steve It seems you are in the minority and I am miffed at your response. From the reports that I have read there were systemic failures of a high hazard plant which could have lead to multiple fatlities but for the grace of God. Total and another company pleaded guilty, suggesting that their failures were evident. Indeed, the Judge, Mr Justice Calvert-Smith said, the companies had shown “a slackness, inefficiency and a more or less complacent attitude to safety.” Seems a fair cop to me - hence my earlier comment.

.....found out why its been removed not displayed.........i have responded by email......... however as the moderators are quicker responding to posting than they are emails..you can edit the offending asterisks out and put in GUTS

I agree with you Steve! Ken

Steve I did not say or meant to imply that your original post was 'an attack on anyone holding differing views?' Don't know where you got that notion from. You or anyone else are entitled to hold whatever view you may wish to have regarding the Buncefield fines. However, I am holding my views on the level of fines based upon the facts of the case and nothing else. The level of culpability would have been assessed in determining the fines I'm sure, as should the potential for a catastrophic incident resulting in multiple fatalities. It is often argued that the level of risk, as opposed to the outcome, is not fully appreciated by the courts. I believe this case is another example where the potential risk has not been reflected by the fine.

I support Steve on this. A simple cursory read of some of the more significant documentation produced illustrates the complexities. I have extracted a couple of phrases lifted from the various reports on the Buncefield Incident site. I apologise for this generalist approach to quotes but I have been careful to try to avoid lifting out of context. "One important aspect of the incident was that a severe explosion took place, which would not have been anticipated in any major hazard assessment of the oil storage depot prior to the incident" and in another "We consider that the land use planning system at major hazard sites has not kept pace with these changes in society and in Part 1 we call for a wide-ranging review." and in another part "The work carried out by DNV shows how risks from a large petroleum facility can be estimated in the form of individual and societal risk and illustrates the advantages of adopting QRA in a new land use planning system in Britain. It demonstrates clear advantages in land use planning over the protection concept in use at the time of the Buncefield incident, but the events included here of vapour cloud formation, flash fire and explosion were not recognised hazards before the incident." Redken and others. The historical responses by HSE to requests re planning approvals are public domain and are all listed within the report. So as Steve suggests the circumstances of this incident contains failings for which the companies have been rightly punished, failings associated with system failures and environmental pollution. However, the intensity of the consequence arises from circumstances that the report makes clear would not have been recognised prior to the incident and the damage to nearby property either by the same issue or the inability of the planning systems to prevent development close to the terminal. I risk making a comment without checking the detail of the charges and verdicts but in practical terms the failure that started the sequence was simple overfill and it must surely be that systems failure/systemic deficiencies and the consequent pollution that forms the base of the punishment issued by the court, not the social outrage element and the extent of the consequence? P48