FLT hit pedestrian. Marked crossing point was 15m further away. Pedestrian chose to ignore safety instruction, driver did not expect a pedestrian there. Positioning of crossing point flawed and did not anticipate behaviour.
Redesign introduced mandatory stop, mirror and partial demolition of a wall.

Kate
Thanks for the information, it is a very deep topic.
I have the HSG48 book, I myself using this for reference as it starts off very well in Ch1 about what are human factors to Ch6 and the case histories.
The Buncefield report is good, a bit long with all the recommendations but easy to see how one thing leads to another and then 'bang'.
Many thanks for the input.
Stuart

I agree with Kate, in that most if not all incidents are related to human factors (ergonomics) and/or human error. Basically there are two genres of human error - the immediate and the underlying causal factors, sometimes described as active and latent failures. The first type is associated via the 'trigger' effect and is prevalent in all accidents. The second type is usually associated with more serious and complex incidents.

An excellent book on the causes, influences and cultural factors of accidents is: Accident and design - contemporary debates in risk management: Hood C. and Jones DKC.

Another one to ponder:
Contractors finished a welding job on a tank on a chemical plant early and started the 2nd tank. Sadly the 2nd tank had not been cleaned yet, no PTW issued and the sparks ignited residues, resulting in an explosion, killing both the welder and his mate. The assumption was that the welders were looking to speed up the job to be helpful.
Chemical company heavily fined in Crown Court for allowing the unsafe work to progress. They did not take in to account that human behaviour could circumvent their PTW procedures.
The irony was that this took place whilst a corporate safety audit team was on site!

Stuart

If you want to address 'human factors' (i.e. links between thoughts, emotions and actions) in relation to safety at work, relevant research has enlarged greatly beyond ergonomics and behavioural safety, although this may seldom reach the safety magazines.

What's called a 'socio-cognitive' approach has been tested by several smart researchers: Dov Zohar, in Israel, and Sharon Clarke, in Manchester Business School, are two who write about it very clearly. What they can enable the safety professional to do is the measure perceptions of employees across an organsiation on two sets of influences on safety performance: senior management's prononcements, policies and procedures (or silence and absence of policies and procedures, on the one hand, and the actual practices of supervisors and operational managers. The ratings of employees provide a telling portrait of the safety climate overall and the safety sub-climates in different parts of an organisation.

This data is a necessary corrective where a safety professional gets excited about 'human factors' and 'ergonomics', gains investment ££ for these disciplines and ends up 'in stuck' and/or covering up because he has simply failed to gather and report reliable data about the powerful safety climates.

Perhaps I should add that as a registered member of the IEHF, I also advocate 'human factors' where and to the extent that it's appropriae. Where funds are limited, an ergonomic intervention is at times far cost-effective than gauging the safety climate validly and reliably and ensuring that management receive a report on their responsibilities as shown by these datga.

CRNBaker
Good example.
Always a need to separate vehicles and pedestrians.
Regards
Stuart

Boblewis
I can see your point in that managers think they are saving time and money by doing what you have stated, or by being just stupid.
Thanks for a different view of how things go wrong.
Stuart