Good morning, I'm about to research some case law & text on implied terms of contract regarding H&S duties of supervision. I am implementing formal procedures in a once very informal organisation and am trying to demonstrate that because something hasn't been written in black and white, the fact he is in a position and has been trained externally to a supervisors level with industry and specific H&S training, he has certain obligations regarding ensuring the workforce are working safely. I'm basically trying to educate before looking at the disciplinary route - And it has been a while since completing the Unit A with all case law, though that will be my first port of call. So any reference's or links will be gratefully received.

Adale Your stated objective of 'implementing formal procedures in a once very information organisation' is a challenging cultural change. Of the 4 main dimensions of organisational culture - mission, involvement, consistency and adaptability - frequently the lowest is 'adaptability' So, you've quite an 'educational' task on hand to improve both consistency and adaptability - but you risk an even greater 'disciplinary' hurdle if you rely on that option. May I suggest that you introduce a reliable and valid measure of stress and burnout, so that you are seen to be consistent and even-handed in pinpointing legitimate barriers to the feet-dragging individual you wish to influence. The data you collect can also support both educational and disciplinary options more effectively and speedily than 'case law and text'. If you need any references on these matters, you're welcome to pm me.

The excellent reference by Emeritus Professor James Reason CBE and is colleagues can enable you to check out your assumptions before you take any kind of disciplinary action: 'Diagnosing 'vulnerable system syndrome': an essential prerequisite to effective risk management', J T Reason, J Carthey, M R deLeval, Quality in Health Care, 2001, 10(Suppl II)ii21-ii25.

Research on organisational cultures supports the modus operandi that appears to support Ray's view. At one phase of my evolution as a safety practitioner, I was asked for assistance in relation to a young and a mid-life female psychiatrist in two different NHS hospitals. The request in relation to the young one came through the BMA; it was to prepare a report as an expert witness after she had been held at knifepoint in an room in Outpatients' Department, nine months after a report from inspectors to the Chief Executive of the leading teaching hospital who employed her stated that the room should not be used until 4 relatively inexpensive structural changes were made to the room. The young lady was unable to work again as a psychiatrist after the incident and it took her four years to get a financial settlement at figure less than the annual salary of a psychiatric consultant. From memory, nobody was nominated as the person responsible for safety management before the incident; after it, over 100 'man-hours' of committee time was spent talking about the incident and avoided making any decision to do anything different to prevent a recurrence. The request in relation to the mid-life psychiatrist came to me in a personal phonecall after she had been threatened with a machete outside her office one morning and cancelled her list of appointments for the rest of the day. I drafted a memo which she sent to the CEO the next day. When she had no reply a month later she successfully applied for an appointment in another hospital where she's been quite successful and free from risk of unauthorised execution. A junior HR person did speak to her about her memo to the CEO shortly before she left the hospital which evidently regarded a physical threat to the life of an expensive member of medical staff as routine. James Reason has set out the conditions which permit this to happen in the reference already given. By contrast, mimimal formal legal controls of the kind that saf is preoccupied with are irrelevant in this uncivilised state of affairs.