My question is: How do larger organisations manage activities such as hot works / electrical working, let's say in domestic premises (British Gas etc.). Do they use PTW systems and have Supervisors visiting premises multiple times a day (opening/monitoring/closing) or, do they train the Engineers/Technicians to manage their own works on the basis of being 'authorised and trained persons?' I appreciate best practice but am looking for 'real world' examples. Any pragmatic responses welcome! Simon

I've been pondering the practicality of similar just recently, and have come down in favour of the approach described in the DSEAR ACoP - a high/medium/low approach with: low risk: operating procedures medium risk: safety method statement high risk: immediate risk of serious injury, incapacity etc. = PTW. PTW requires the immediate involvement of a responsible person, emergency controls, rescue, summoning help etc. Competency applies across the board. MS will often involve OP. PTW will most often reference MS and maybe OP too. The immediate pragmatic conclusion is you cannot realistically apply PTW for a lone worker. Other pragmatic test: Does the application of a PTW reduce the risk, or does a record of signature and close-off merely provide false comfort for those elsewhere? I look forward to a bit of discussion on this one. I've heard a lot of nonsense about "Permits" over the years.

Would I expect a BG engineer changing the meter in my home to be issued a permit? - No he should be Gas Safe and competent for the complexity of the task Would the exact same engineer changing the meter at my employers premises be issued a permit? - Yes he would have a minimum of two company issued permits (supported by BG Method Statement and Risk Assessments) - one for line breaking and one for hot works. Why the difference - because my employers premises has unique risks not found in domestic situations that can be reasonably foreseen by BG and we have a need to demonstrate control measures for high risk activity to the company insurers. Logic test: Is it abnormal compared to the general day to day business undertaking? Yes = "Permit" i.e. extended controls No = Low level control via training, Operating Procedures / Method Statement & Risk Assessment Lone Worker Permits in synopsis: Yes, I have had to complete them (as a recipient) in previous employment No, the undertaking was no safer and the measures would more likely have found a corpse rather than a casualty - may be a little different today with lone worker / fall alarm systems unfortunately it is the individuals and not the paper which make any system work

Real world experiences were requested - my employer has a unit where the meter point has found itself in what has now become a DSEAR zone 2 as a consequence of changing business activity. We are also not the first occupants of the building an industrial unit with a long and very different history from the current occupancy. We process materials with low flash point and so in reviewing the proposed change requested by the supply company concluded a hot work permit would be required to split the existing soldered joints on the incoming pipework along with the process disruption of clearing the area of any potential fuels and risks. Very fortunate to have the full support of a workforce that asks questions first in a timely manner rather than requiring the pieces picking up after the event ala putting a signature on a form to comply with insurance terms. So when we got the notification of proposed works MS and RA were requested before we agreed to any works at site and during the review concluded our permitting requirements. Possibly one of the benefits of reviewing and writing actual Method Statements - you look at the site and the task to see what is truly what - also why contractors hate our site where a remote Method Statement (and apologies to those that do) copied from a consultants template is totally unacceptable.

Many thanks guys, not much of a discussion after all Ron! Based on your feedback and my own thoughts we will also align with the DSEAR approach as suggested for practical management of certain work activities where on site Supervision (to open, monitor and close) permits is unrealistic. However, this is as always subject to client requirement. Simon

Good food for thought above - this is a subject which it seems very easy to end up with a system which (exactly as Ron suggests) sometimes just provides false comfort for those not carrying out the work. In my last job I inherited a PTW system developed on a site which had suffered a fatality 15 years ago (unrelated to any of the PTW issues but obviously influencing a well-intended drive to get things right). The arrangements for isloation of plant for maintenance meant that permits were being issued every time someone needed to isolate a section of plant to (for example) sweep under a conveyor. The plant being old, this meant there were often 30+ permits per day, all for the same couple of people. After lots of trial and consultation we changed this to: 3 people (supervisor plus 2 managers) designated as Permit Issuers, others trained in the system and designated Permit Users (including the Supervisor). Whenever a job requires isolation, a Permit Issuer must instruct whether a permit is required. If the job is routine, uncomplex (no up- or down-stream risks arising from the work) and no other teams are working in the same area, AND no subcontractors / non-employees are involved then a permit is not required, BUT a member of the work team is designated Isolation Coordinator and makes sure isolation procedures are followed, and that the senior person present on site is informed of the isolation. All work under permit must have a written MS and a briefing carried out. No records are kept of non-permit isolation (this was the subject of much discussion, and I agree with the outcome), but management monitor these arrangements thoroughly and will review this point in particular after 6 months. We changed the lock out arrangements to involves multi-hasps and personalised colour-coded padlocks (buying £2.5k of padlocks was the thing to sell to management), and a first-on, last-off system for the Isolation Coordinator, as well as other checks. The above system meant that the Supervisor (and him only) was able to both determine a job didn't need a permit, and then carry out the work which if it was a rare 1-man job meant that theoretically no-one else might know he was doing this if he failed to properly inform. This is one of those cases where you just can't implement a system that completely prevents people doing idiotic things without adding unreasonable burden to everyone. The Supervisor ALWAYS checks / informs others if plant needs isolated and picks a suitable time which won't impact production, or arranges downtime - he'd soon be out of a job if he didn't! He is also the most familiar person on site with the risks involved and competent to determine when a task needs additional management. I realise that last para might be one which some may disagree with. It was a result of several months discussion, trial and examination of exactly what kind of work was being done. Creating a system that meant the competent Supervisor could determine the need for a permit, and that even where work is not under permit the isolation procedures are well-understood, more robust and easily inspected has resulted in a workforce that feels safer and that when they DO work under permit they understand why, and the seriousness of the issue. It turned out that well over 90% of the permits previously issued were for tasks where they're not required under this system. Sorry about the massive post, I enjoy reading others' examples of how they tackle a problem and agree with Ron that this is an important subject where I've certainly learned a lot over the last few years.