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Xavier123  
#1 Posted : 01 February 2016 09:53:22(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
Xavier123

Fascinating risk perception article from the BBC. Would be very interesting to read some original material on this if anyone has some links? http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-35432071
RayRapp  
#2 Posted : 01 February 2016 10:22:08(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
RayRapp

Thanks Xavier, interesting article. When I did my MSc we studied the concept of risk and I realised then how complex the phenomenon can be. You only have to read many of the posts on these forums to understand there is little in terms of consensus - risk being part objective and part subjective. Indeed, the Challenger disaster was dubbed a 'permitted violation' due to the known risk of the O-ring failure in freezing temperatures was ignored by NASA managers in order to allow the spacecraft to launch.
JayPownall  
#3 Posted : 01 February 2016 10:44:29(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
JayPownall

..like RayRapp, was also a topic for discussion in my MSc and highlighted how commercial drivers and contracts pushed safety out of the way. There was a very interesting video shown to us all which is probably located on Youtube somewhere, focusing solely on the 'Groupthink' aspect of the disaster. If I come across it i'l post the link. Appreciate the article heads up!
jay  
#4 Posted : 01 February 2016 11:23:25(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
jay

The reason for the O-Ring was that the solid booster was in sections as that contract was awarded to Thiokol Morton in Utah and transported to the launch site in Florida, a political decision! A single piece would have removed the need for the O-rings! We has an excellent presentation on the topic by Stephen Carver at our Branh Meeting https://www.iosh.co.uk/~...e_Shuttle_Disasters.ashx
Andrew W Walker  
#5 Posted : 01 February 2016 11:40:23(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
Andrew W Walker

Jay wrote:
The reason for the O-Ring was that the solid booster was in sections as that contract was awarded to Thiokol Morton in Utah and transported to the launch site in Florida, a political decision! A single piece would have removed the need for the O-rings! We has an excellent presentation on the topic by Stephen Carver at our Branh Meeting https://www.iosh.co.uk/~...e_Shuttle_Disasters.ashx
The major problem with NASA was that there was:-  Too much management and not enough leadership I think we can all relate to that... Andy
Xavier123  
#6 Posted : 01 February 2016 13:06:58(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
Xavier123

Thanks for that link Jay. Giving away my age a little but I was of young school age when it occurred. The George Box quote 'All models are wrong but some are useful' is an intriguing one too when laid over the variety of risk assessment tools used across the various industries.
aud  
#7 Posted : 01 February 2016 13:22:16(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
aud

Xavier123 One of the best books on the Challenger subject is by Diane Vaughan's “The Challenger Launch Decision”. I have only just got through the 422 pages. (575 with appendices, notes, index etc). but this book is referenced so often by other safety authors (Dekker, Perrow, Chiles) that I felt driven to acquire it. She uses the term ‘normalisation of deviance’ to describe the cultural climate. The most significant aspect of this acclaimed reference, is that the author is NOT a safety or engineering specialist. She is a sociologist. She wanted to understand – as the title suggests – the decision-making processes leading to the launch. Risk assessment, and subsequent management, is about decision making. And not usually decision making by H&S specialists, but by a wide range of other people, influenced by their standing in the organisation as much as anything else, and the cultural norms, including leadership. Edward Tufte is also a relevant read; he critiques the ‘bullet-point culture’ of 'dumbed-down' communication within NASA, (and others) which distorts and skews scientific and risk data. So, topic areas of great significance to risk decisions are: sociology, psychology, and effective communication design. How much of the NEBOSH syllabus do these topics take up?
jay  
#8 Posted : 01 February 2016 14:26:21(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
jay

Diane Vaughan's proposition regarding "Normalization of Deviance" is what many of us may relate to!
jay  
#9 Posted : 01 February 2016 16:44:36(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
jay

There is a set of very good videos on the same subject by Stephen Carver--as usual in his unique style! Stephen Carver - NASA Case Study-part 1
Stephen Carver - NASA Case Study- Part 2
Stephen Carver - NASA Case Study-Part 3
Stephen Carver - NASA Case Study-Part 4
Xavier123  
#10 Posted : 02 February 2016 08:21:48(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
Xavier123

I'll have to queue those up for the train home sometime over the next few weeks...
bob youel  
#11 Posted : 02 February 2016 08:28:52(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
bob youel

I listened to Stirling Moss speak to a reporter about how the edge has gone from modern motor racing compaired to his day thus making it less exciting and the reporter talked about the deaths in the sport thereafter SM noted that he and other drivers had just come out of a war so a few deaths in a sport did not amount to too much noting what they had come through Thus risk perception is a very complicated thing e.g. once U have been in a fire fight i.e. bullets flying all around you; your preception becomes different to another persons risk perception who has never been in such a situation additionally a persons nature has a lot to do with things so I suggest that everybody studies the subject in detail from as many sources as possible noting, in my personal opinion, that as a whole this country is becoming much to risk averse and that is not what H&S is about
jwk  
#12 Posted : 02 February 2016 10:23:26(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
jwk

It's a good point Bob, we have two very different risk cultures. Our UK operations follow the consensus framework for industrial risk in the UK; i.e. any injury at work is best avoided and is a 'bad thing'. On the other hand our International people don't really even see a risk unless there are munitions or natural cataclysms in the picture. We did Challenger as part of my IRM Dip, lots to learn from it, John
sadlass  
#13 Posted : 04 February 2016 15:24:03(UTC)
Rank: Forum user
sadlass

Jay Brilliant stuff from Steven Carver links - thanks for that. Recommend to all.
caddyman  
#14 Posted : 05 February 2016 09:10:48(UTC)
Rank: Forum user
caddyman

Bob - good points - well made
jay  
#15 Posted : 05 February 2016 12:35:03(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
jay

The credit for my posting should primarily go to the IOSH Thames Valley Branch. Its executive committee had organised the invite to Stephen Carver on 16th January 2006 ( it is in my CPD record) for this topic and a couple of others. I cannot recall the name of the Branch Programme person.My view is that there can be and indeed are excellent speakers at Branch meetings.
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