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KieranD  
#1 Posted : 09 November 2017 10:44:37(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
KieranD

In 2016, the IOSH commissioned and published a report on health, safety and welfare in global container terminals by safety psychologists at Cardiff University.

Amongst other things, they concluded that, despite well. documented behavioural safety procedures, senior managers had chronically failed in communication with operatives and were accountable for abnormally high levels of injuries and instanced of illhealth.

As social network science is a fertile way to represent the kind of communication failures arising from the 'structural holes' they reported, I would be appreciative if anyone would let me know about any comparable research.  

RayRapp  
#2 Posted : 13 November 2017 09:40:54(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
RayRapp

Kieran

The only information I can think of is from accident investigations. For example, the Macondo Well blow-out identified numerous latent failures but particularly lessons were not communicated from a similar near miss blow-out some months earlier in another part of the world which could have prevented the disaster.  

KieranD  
#3 Posted : 14 November 2017 02:40:36(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
KieranD

Thank you, Ray

The point you're making is worth including in a Literature Review.

What stimulated my own interest in the 'structural hole' that sometimes arises between a OSH specialist and senior/middle managers was the occasion when I did an ergonomic risk assessment in a factory assembling industrial and marine pumps.  Miscommunication had reached the stage where the Operations and Production Managers told the OSHE Manager 'Your safety leadership isn't worth laughing at!'.  The parent company expressed outrage that there was not the slightest effort to make the changes identified to control risks of musculoskeletal pains (which they priced at £8K per person) that, after a fair warning period, they sold the company to another industry.

KieranD  
#4 Posted : 14 November 2017 08:08:13(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
KieranD

Thanks to your lead, Ray, I've been able to download a copy of the Final Report on the Investigation of the Macondo Well Blowout by the Deepwater Horizon Study Group, March 1, 2011

andybz  
#5 Posted : 14 November 2017 10:29:42(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
andybz

When I studied for my PhD in the 90’s I looked at the published reports of 6 major accidents that had occurred at the time.  One thing that still strikes me to this day is that in every case the inquiry had uncovered information about previous near misses that were very similar to the accident, with the implication being that if lessons had been learnt from the near misses the major accident could have been avoided.  In particular:

* Piper Alpha (1998 - 167 fatalities) - previous incident reports highlighting potential problems with shift handover, permits-to-work, fire fighting capability and evacuation of platforms;

* Allied Colloids Fire (1992 - major environmental impacts) - Need for segregation of chemicals involved well known for many years.  A similar incident had been experienced on the site.

* Hickson & Welch (1992 - 5 fatalities) - Explosive properties of chemicals involved well known for many years.  A similar incident had been experienced at another of the company’s sites.

* Clapham Junction (1988 - 35 fatalities) - Similar incidents had highlighted problems with design,  testing and training within the company’s signalling department.

* Herald of Free Enterprise (1987 - 193 fatalities) - Tannoy calls to send crew to their stations for departure missed on many occasions.  Previous incidents where the company’s ships had left port with their bow doors open.

However, I am not sure that the IOSH/Cardiff paper really says anything very relevant to these types of failures (or Macondo).  I believe the underlying causes were largely related to lack of risk management competence with regard to major hazards.  I find the paper to be focussed (biased) on employee/management communication.

The IOSH/Cardiff paper seems to be based on the principle that:

* Behavioural safety = Bad

* Outsourcing = Bad

* Workforce engagement = Good

* More regulation = Good

I am sure plenty of people will agree with these sentiments, but I have not seen anything in the paper that confirms that they make any difference in the Container Terminal industry.  Also, I note that whilst weakness are identified in the way safety and health and managed, there is nothing to say whether performance is actually better or worse than any other industry. 

Unfortunately, the paper does not address (in my opinion) the really important/interesting issues around a truly global industry, with multi-national companies, working within wildly different cultures, with different levels human skill and technology.  It is easy to suggest that a ‘zero harm’ strategy has its limitations, but I note that an alternative is not proposed.  Lots of global mega-companies in other industries have similar high level strategies, which suggests to me that at the corporate level anything more complex has proven difficult to put into practice.

RayRapp  
#6 Posted : 14 November 2017 11:07:02(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
RayRapp

Kieran, you're welcome.

Incidentally there were several reports commissioned - I cannot recall the specific report which I was referring to except I remember it was 400 pages long!!

andybz, interesting observations. The overly used phrase 'Lessons will be learnt' sounds a bit hollow when looking at accidents and incidents. Notwithstanding this needs to be tempered with hindsight bias where everything seems so clear and obvious post event.

KieranD  
#7 Posted : 14 November 2017 11:08:46(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
KieranD

Many thanks, Andybz, for your thoughtful reflections.  It is useful to note the accidents you identify.

I think your observations are right in relation to the difference between Walters' report and the other.  What differentiates them lies in the structure of the container terminals whereby senior managers were reported to assert that they had 'done their job' by setting up a behavioural safety scheme and it was up to others, particularly operatives, to make it work.  To my mind, this simply identifies limits to 'behvavioural safety', which is very very different to labelling it as 'bad'

The thrust of my interest lies in structural situations, which - as far as I can establish - are addressed by 'social network science', a domain in which there appears to be only one report published:  carried out by Cranfield School of Manaagement, it includes a cross-sectional survey of firms in retail and logistics sectors, which are far less hazardous (in terms of variety and velocity of most hazards) than construction and mass transport; this report was commissioned by the IOSH and published by IOSH free of charge

At this stage, my conjecture is that social network science can throw light on behavioural patterns of communication, good and bad, that can either support or undermine safety and health.  Where these behavioural patterns undermine safety and health and are not identified and resolved, they are apt to result in prolonged waste of resources as well as injuries and illnesses.  Even surveys of occupational safety and health which take account of Reason's studies of human error, such as that of Chmiel and Hansez in The Wiley Blackwell Handbook of The Psychology of Occupational Safety and Workplace Health edited by Clarke et al., 2016 make no reference to structural problems of miscommunication and mistification identified by Walters and Wadsworth.

Likewise an otherwise excellent report on 'networked' firms in construction, by Gibbs et al, commissioned by the IOSH and published free of charge by the IOSH, omits any discussion of the application of social network science; there is simply one passing reference to this discipline out of a total of over 100 references.

As far as I can establish, the root problem lies in the applicaiton of  of 'psychology' and 'sociology' as discrete  discrete disciplines to occupational safety and health.  The nearest I can find to relevant research so far are studies of influencing by the social psychologist Noam Friedkin in 1998, 2001 and, with Johnsen, in 2011

KieranD  
#8 Posted : 14 November 2017 11:27:33(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
KieranD

Andybz

In case it might be of a little interest, I can forward to you a copy of a presentation I did at the 2014confernce of the British Psychological Society's Division of Occupational Psychology in January 2014: 'Oops! How social identity theory can help with spoiled identiy of safety leadership'.  There I applied the theory of social identity to account for the sustained set-to between the OSHE manager and the Operations and Production Manager;  this was apparently reinforced by the General Manager and the HR manager who simply refused to discuss the message I presented to manaagement.  Whereas team leaders were extremely responsive to the evidence I presented, the only response of middle/senior managers to photographic, numerical and analytical evidence was 'They always blame management!', a simple distortion of the evidence presented.   

KieranD  
#9 Posted : 14 November 2017 14:34:49(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
KieranD

Andy/Ray

Reading reports on safety disasters prompts me to conclude that the root issue is about the drivers motivating an organisation, so that the critical task of disaster prevention lies in balancing legal and system compliance with organic communication through an in-company management social network. 

This is very different to the mechanistic models of communication underpinning the reports outlined above, essentially because it pays systematic attention to gaps in communication, which mechanistic managemenet address by simply denying.   

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