Welcome Guest! The IOSH forums are a free resource to both members and non-members. Login or register to use them

Postings made by forum users are personal opinions. IOSH is not responsible for the content or accuracy of any of the information contained in forum postings. Please carefully consider any advice you receive.

Notification

Icon
Error

Options
Go to last post Go to first unread
messyshaw  
#1 Posted : 09 April 2013 18:21:29(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
messyshaw

Consider this:

You have a large city centre building containing thousands of staff

You have well established fire evacuation plans using fire wardens to sweep evacuated areas and report to a central coordinator. The procedure and staff have been tested during numerous drills and the system has been given the green light from the local fire enforcement team.

The 'sweep' system was chosen as there is not a suitable sized space to get all the thousands of occupants to assemble in one place for a roll call

But what about a bomb evacuation? It's not feasible/safe to the volunteer delay fire warden's to send them into potentially a high risk area to sweep and confirm it's clear of staff
So what do you do to ensure the building is totally evacuated?

Any views or examples of best practice??????
martinw  
#2 Posted : 09 April 2013 19:16:42(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
martinw

Hi Messy

recently rewrote a strategy in a central London building, again thousands of staff, multiple governmental departments each on two of the eight floors above ground. Sweep system. Fire evac was default through the front door with assembly outside the front of the building(unless the fire was there of course). In the event of a bomb evac, exit route was down to the basement, into the underground car park(high level of protection - thick concrete roof - where they seperated by different organisation, so that each member of each organisation knew where their assembly point was situated.

Sweep system was the same, and out of hours, individuals were responsible for signing in with security, and signing out when they left. The alarm system posed a problem - due to the fact that the fire alarm sounding caused staff normally to go to their normal fire assembly point, the local police and LFB wanted a seperate tone which was different from go the fire alarm tones, to ensure that people did not go to the wrong assembly point. There was a spoken element to the alarm which due to the age of the system could not be amended, so it was decided that security controller would give a spoken instruction that the building was to be evacuated, and that assembly point B would be the one used.

Not ideal. But landlord would not pay for a new system.
bleve  
#3 Posted : 10 April 2013 00:16:55(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
bleve

Martin
Basement car park would not be considered a place of safety as this area would be typically targeted as a location of maximum damage in order to bring down the building via car/van bomb etc.

Maximum damage to structural elements and increase in overpressure likely to result in loss of life due to containment.

Personally, I would not go near the underground car park as a place of assembly or comparative safety.
bleve  
#4 Posted : 10 April 2013 01:10:50(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
bleve

“But what about a bomb evacuation? It's not feasible/safe to the volunteer delay fire warden's to send them into potentially a high risk area to sweep and confirm it's clear of staff
So what do you do to ensure the building is totally evacuated”

Messy, Unless military or political target, it would be normal for said terrorist to attempt to provide for evacuation of civilian’s from the premises prior to detonation. However and of course mistakes can and do occur.

IMO, it is not a case of sending wardens back into the building or having them carry out a protracted sweep beyond the time expected for general evacuation of the populace in question. I would anticipate a very short period of delay in respect of wardens following immediately behind the evacuating staff from the building. This is as much as may be expected and can only be considered as an action carried out in so far as is reasonably practicable. IMO, verification of persons reported post evacuation, is then down to the emergency services.

Selection of emergency escape, place of safety and stand-off distance is down to the emergency preparedness of the organisation in question. It is not easy to predict the planting of explosive devices on normal access/egress routes versus alternative means of escape or indeed car parking locations. As you are well aware, that is where demonstrable competence should be considered by the organisation in question.

Typically and in my experience, explosive ordinance of a size to cause substantial damage, is restricted to goods received or car parking/load bay areas, unless security is lax to the degree that brief case sized packages can be introduced to site. Bio or incendiary threats on the other hand, can be delivered to specific desk/personnel or office locations.




bob youel  
#5 Posted : 10 April 2013 07:44:31(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
bob youel

Before anything else undertake a suitable and sufficient risk assessment and do all that you can to confirm that real risk exists and if such a risk is real move on from there taking note of the comments 'Bleve' has noted herein and even get in a specialist to help

As an x-sapper who dealt with such things I get frustrated when management want to send people back inside a confined space [a building] to undertake a sweep and search who are not competent to know what to look for as bombs do not come marked as such and come in all shapes and sizes usually disguised in such circumstances so an average S&S would reveal nothing except possible harm

Best of luck and it shows that you are behaving properly to consider such areas
jontyjohnston  
#6 Posted : 10 April 2013 12:52:39(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
jontyjohnston

messy

I have lived and worked in Belfast for half a century and every one of my employers needed to develop suitable evac procedures for bomb alerts, especially the case in my 18 years in the power industry where every asset was a target.

I worked closely with all the emergency services and there advise was to use your existing process, in our case sweep, to clear the building as it was a tried and tested and effective existing process. They advised against adding unnecessary new process. In all the drills and the THREE occasions when we actually had alerts, with one being the real thing (300kg bomb in small van) the process worked fine.

One piece of advice was to consider a bomb outside of the building, easiest place to put it, the risk was then of evacuating people into an unknown area of risk. Advice was to keep people in the building but away from areas of glazing etc, best place was in any protected staircase.

But Bob's advice is key, never ever go looking for a suspect device, they don't want to be found!
martinw  
#7 Posted : 10 April 2013 13:32:30(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
martinw

Bleve

Agreed. I raised the same points but those in senior positions within the organisations which occupied the building dissented, giving their collective opinion that the main risk to their building would come from external explosive sources. Therefore they decided to stay indoors.

Up to them.
Users browsing this topic
Guest
You cannot post new topics in this forum.
You cannot reply to topics in this forum.
You cannot delete your posts in this forum.
You cannot edit your posts in this forum.
You cannot create polls in this forum.
You cannot vote in polls in this forum.