Hi Jerome
You have written "expletive deleted" and I am going to avoid needing to write the same.
Nevertheless you have quoted from the BS textbook that is so prevalent in the O&G and broader extractive industries.
H&S speak is full of abbreviations and acronyms that OSH professionals sometimes seem to assume that everyone else should be familiar with.
The Forum Rules prohibit me from spelling out one interpretation of BS so I will avoid that, but instead translate it as Behavioral Safety (making no apology for the English US spelling as BS took root in the USA).
In the USA they have OSHA Regulations which are usually nice and simple as they tell you what to DO (prescription) or what NOT TO DO (proscription).
Whereas in the UK and geographies where legislation is built on the British model, we go for the "goal setting" approach so that duties are qualified by words such as "so far as reasonably practicable".
Whilst it is quite difficult to benchmark OSH perfomance in different countries, often as the rules as to what to count or not vary very susbstantially it is very clear that occupational accident rates in the US are MUCH, MUCH higher in the US than in the UK.
So, in the absence of any other credible explanation it appears that the goal setting approach has been a greater success than the prescription and proscription that comes with being in a geography where e.g. OSHA Regulations are the law or have been adopted by some organisations where there is not that much law to work with e.g. in the Middle East.
The O&G and other extractive industries have proved time and time again that they appear to have little ability to learn from the past whether at individual corporation level OR as sectors as a whole and so similar things happen again and again.
...and I suggest that much of this can be blamed on BS, with more focus usually being given to unsafe ACTS than unsafe CONDITIONS partly as a result of misinterpretion (whether deliberately or not( of the findings of Henirich in 1931, Bird in 1969 and others.
In another thread you suggest that "fatigue" might be a "root cause" of something going wrong. It would be VERY rare than fatigue was ACTUALLY a root cause but easy to identify it as such in an investigation that does not deep nearly far enough to look for the underlying causes, usually being management failings which some may be uncomfortable about unearthing.
Suppose a worker falls when a corroded floor grid on a walkway gives way, it is very easy to conclude that the reason for the fall was that the worker was not properly "tied on" and not bother to ask why the floor and each grid had not been maintained as that means asking why management didn't have an effective preventive maintenance programme in place.
Have you read e.g. the "Telos report" that BP Texas City commissioned and received before their plant went bang in 2005, killing 15 and injuring about 200?
NOT the first time and not the last time that BP would have just celebrated best company OSHA numbers at a site which would then become the scene of a disaster.
....or the reports on the tailing dams failures first at Fundao, then a few years later at Brumadinho? In statistical terms from an H&S perspective Fundao only killed 19 (the environmental impact was huge) whereas nearly 300 died at Brumadinho? Do you think that multinational Vale whose Sustainability Reports have majored on their apparently good OSHA metrics learned from Fundao before something very similar happened again.
As for mobile towers, most users of these Forums live in geographies which work to "goal setting" standards and the prescriptive and proscriptive OSHA standards you quote do not apply even if some of the principles do but with different numbers when it comes to recommended thresholds for this or that.