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Posted By Raymond Rapp
An unsafe practice was allowed to continue and therefore condoned by management for 3 whole days. Taken in isolation this practice is not so unsafe, indeed in certain circumstances it is invoked as a matter of course. However, given that over the 3 day period it was repeated several hundred times greatly increases the likelihood of an adverse and potentially serious incident.
I am currently investigating how and why this unsafe condition ocurred in the first instance and whether a risk assessment could have properly identified the risks involved over a sustained period (but at the time unkown) of time before the unsafe condition could be rectified.
Apologies for not stating what the incident involved, but as it is a technical issue it would take a whole paragraph to explain it.
Your thoughts and ideas would be most welcome.
Regards
Ray
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Posted By Bill Fisher
Raymond
I have to suggest that a description paragraph will give you a better return and indeed a more focussed return.
A couple of of-the-cuff comments, without knowing detail.
1. You hint that the situation was not "forseeable" in which case Risk Assessment wouldn't have helped.
2. However you have, I am sure a system in place - we call it "STAR" - Stop, Think, Act, Review - which effectively works on arising changes and looks for just that to happen.
So in essence that should have picked it up.
Regards
Bill
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Posted By Raymond Rapp
Bill
Thanks for your thoughts. I wil include a description of the problem as you suggest as follows:
During some major refurbishment work of a high profile station a platform was closed for phase 1 of the project. When the platform was commissioned fit for use after phase 1, an important electrical device fitted to the platform was not working. This equipment (Correct Side Door Enabling) prevents the train doors being opened on the wrong side by the operator. Train operators must operate a manual override button in the cab to open the doors, which in itself causes a problem because the correct doors are on the opposite side of the CSDE button. Increasing the risk of the doors being opend incorrectly. Furthermore, the adjacent platform was closed for phase 2 and trains were not stopping, increasing the risk of somebody falling out the doors and being killed by a passing train.
Now, the questions I have to ask are; why was the CSDE equiment not working in the first instance; who approved the potentially unsafe practice of manually overriding the CSDE equipment; and would a risk assessment have properly identified the problem, bearing in mind the unkown time scale of getting the equipment fixed.
Ray
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Posted By Stuart Nagle
Ray.
Firstly:
I would have thought that designer risks, in the refurbishment of the station should have highlighted the need to ensure that new fixed equipment was in place, tested and operational prior to re-commisioning of the station.
This could have been in the form of a checklist to ensure all safety critical componenets were fully operational before accepting handover....
Secondly: Design layout of controls probably have not changed for some time - to avoid operator error in situations like this (but I stand to be corrected), but if automated, as you seem to imply by the control unit, if the control unit was fitted and working would the doors have been openable on the 'wrong' side? Perhaps not....
This would/should/was perhaps a further indication of an un-safe system in respect of the design/commisioning, and should perhaps have been tested prior to commisioning....
I appreciate that the problems may well stem for other areas, such as completion dates/times etc necessary to ensure the transport systems were operational within a contract period, but it appears to be an inherent fault in the commisioning process rather than an oversight in health and safety per se, which led to a possible major problem.
It would appear to me, being a sceptic of human nature, that perhaps someone knew all about this, but perhaps it was overlooked in order to facilitate meeting a dealine!! and that the system could be controlled by other means (the button) until such time as the ERROR could be corrected....
Stuart
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Posted By Raymond Rapp
Stuart
Without pre-judging the issue before I ascertain all the facts, I suspect your last paragraph is very close to the truth.
Whilst why the unsafe condition arose and was allowed to continue is of importance, the real conundrum is whether the inherent risks could have been foreseen, perhaps via a risk assessment. Indeed, should a risk assessment have been mandatory given the circumstances.
Your other points though not unrelevant refer to the general management of safety and in particular the handover of projects. For obvious reasons I cannot go into too much detail but I will be raising these as a matter of course.
No one has mentioned whether any health and safety laws have been compromised and I have my own views on this. However, had a serious incident occurred during this 3 day period I am certain the regulators would have been jumping all over the place.
Ray
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Posted By Ken Taylor
I'm not familiar with any of this but wonder whether you have highlighted a failure to adequately consider the ergonomic aspects of design for the manual controls. Controls need to be designed to accord with people rather than relying on people to adapt to controls.
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Posted By Raymond Rapp
Ken
Could not agree more with you. However, we are talking railways and the rolling stock I am referring to is over 40 years old. Back in those days ergonomics was in its embryonic stage!
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Posted By Philip Roberts
Raymond,
Risk assessments should be reviewed periodically and when significant changes have been made. I would think that major refurbishment would count as a significant change so a risk assesssment should have been done on re-commissioning the platform. This should have picked up any safety related features not in operation and the added risk of train movement on the second platform. I would think that some breaches of RGS have taken place as well as breaches of Management of H&S regulations, but stand to be corrected,
regards
Phil
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Posted By Jonathan Sandler
Ray,
As a safety advisor could you someone have advised fellow workers that the plaltform should be closed on safety grounds?
This matter should be reported to SCIRAS.
The Designer, along with the whole project team in failing ing their duty of care.
This matter could have been prevented, but like most companys PROFIT FIRST SAFETY SECOND.
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Posted By Raymond Rapp
Jonathan
Unfortunately I was not aware of this practice until Wed afternoon (day 3) and following a discussion with colleagues I issued an email to the project manager stating that if the CSDE equipment was not fixed I would issue a safety notice.
I do not think there is any value in reporting this matter to CIRAS as I am dealing with it.
Yes, as you have rightly pointed out the pressures of maintaining a service often leads to safety taking a back seat. This incident is one of many, but I will do my utmost to stamp out poor practice before it becomes endemic.
Ray
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Posted By Jonathan Sandler
Ray,
Somebody must have known in the first inst?
DER? Station Manager?
Why are drivers always taking the blame in a no blame culture environment?
Handback procedures are strict, ref: working manual, QUENSH conditions.
If I can be of any help, please let me know.
Reg is always about to talk to, now senior manager post!!!!!
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