Posted By Gordon Thelwell Are we more likely to take risks if we feel protected? Do safety belts, air bags, and anti-lock brakes lead to more risky driving, for instance? This is one of the most controversial questions in the field of safety. It's an issue many safety professionals ignore or deny. Obviously, the notion that personal protective equipment could encourage risky behaviour is extremely repugnant. But we need to explore this issue: Do we compensate -adjust our behaviour- for perceptions of safety? In recent years, the issue of compensating for safety has been given several different labels, including risk homeostasis, danger compensation, risk-offsetting behaviour, and perverse compensation. Whatever the label, the basic idea of risk compensation is quite simple and straightforward. People are presumed to change their behaviour to compensate for changes in perceived risk. If a job is made safer with machine guards or the use of PPE, employees might perceive less risk and actually work more dangerously. This idea certainly seems intuitive. In fact, I bet every member here has experienced the phenomenon. I clearly remember the increased risks I took when wearing a standard ice hockey goalie outfit. With the protective helmet and shoulder pads, I'd willingly throw my body at another player or leap high to catch a puck. I didn't perform these behaviours until perceiving security from the personal protective equipment. So how can the phenomenon of risk compensation be denied? Research findings The notion of risk compensation made its debut among safety professionals following the theorizing and archival research of a University of Chicago economist, Dr. Sam Peltzman. Peltzman systematically compared vehicle crash statistics before (1947-1956) and after (1966-1972) the regulated installation of safety engineering innovations in vehicles, including seat belts, energy absorbing steering columns, padded instrument panels, penetration-resistant windshields, and dual braking systems. As predicted by risk compensation theory, Peltzman found that these vehicle-manufacturing safety standards did not reduce the frequency of crash fatalities per miles driven. Perhaps the most convincing evidence of risk compensation was that the cars equipped with safety devices were involved in a disproportionately high number of crashes. Peltzman's findings have been criticized on a number of counts, primarily statistical; but they did stimulate a number of follow-up investigations. Dr. John Adams of University College, London, UK, for example, compared traffic fatality rates between countries with and without safety belt use laws. His annual comparisons (from 1970 to 1978) showed dramatic reductions in fatal vehicle crash rates after countries introduced seat belt use laws. Taken alone, this data would lend strong support to the seat belt legislation. However, the drop in fatality rates was even greater in countries without safety belt use laws. These studies compared risk behaviours across large data sets. Behavioural scientists call this a between-group design, and it can only indirectly test the occurrence of risk compensation. Since the theory predicts that individuals take more chances after perceiving an increase in safety or security, it can only be tested by comparing the same group of individuals under different conditions. Behavioural science researchers call this a within-subject design. Most within-subject tests of risk compensation theory have been restricted to simulated laboratory investigations. This is because within-subject observations under different risk conditions are time consuming and quite difficult to pull off in a real-world situation. One such study was conducted by Dr. Fredrick Streff and myself in 1987. To conduct this research we built an oval clay go-kart track (about 100 meters in circumference) and equipped a 5-hp go-kart with an inertia reel-type combination shoulder-lap safety harness. Subjects were told to drive the go-kart around the track quickly, but at a "comfortable" speed. The 56 subjects were either buckled or unbuckled in the first of two phases of 15 driving trials. After the first phase, the safety condition was switched for half the subjects. That is, the safety belt was unbuckled for subjects previously buckled up, or the belt was used by subjects who previously did not use it. The speed and accuracy of each subject's driving trial were systematically measured. Following the first and second phases (of 15 trials each), the subjects completed a brief questionnaire that assessed their perceived risk while driving the go-kart. The between-subject comparisons showed no risk compensation. That is, the subjects who used the safety belt for all trials did not drive faster than subjects who never used the safety belt. And, the perceptions of risk were not different across these groups. On the other hand, the within-subject differences did show the predicted changes in risk perception and behaviour. That is, subjects reported feeling safer when they buckled up, and subsequently drove the go-kart significantly faster than subjects who used the safety belt during both phases. The subjects who took off their safety belts reported a significant decrease in perceived safety, but this change in risk perception was not reflected in slower driving speeds (compared to drivers who never buckled up in the go-kart). Our go-kart study was later followed up in the Netherlands using a real car on real roads. Specifically, habitual, "hard-core" non-users of safety belts buckled up at the request of the experimenter. Compared to measures taken when not using a safety belt, these buckled-up drivers drove faster, followed more closely behind vehicles in front of them, changed lanes at higher speeds, and braked later when approaching an obstacle. I'm convinced from personal experience and reading the research literature that risk compensation is a real phenomenon. Safety implications So what does this mean for injury prevention? First, the off-setting or compensating behaviour doesn't negate the benefits of safety protections. Although football players increase risky behaviours when suited up, they sustain far fewer injuries than they would without the PPE. More importantly, Professor Gerald Wilde, the leader in risk homeostasis theory and research, says safety excellence cannot be achieved through top-down rules and mandates. Under these conditions, some people only follow the rules when they are supervised and might take greater risks when they feel "free." Such behaviour is predicted by risk compensation theory. As the title of his 1994 book, "Target Risk," indicates, Wilde advocates that safety interventions need to reduce the level of risk people are willing to tolerate. This requires a change in values. Wilde claims that improvements in safety cannot be achieved through training, engineering or enforcement. In his words, "the extent of risk taking with respect to safety and health in a given society, therefore, ultimately depends on values that prevail in that society, and not on the available technology" (Wilde, 1994, p. 223). This means, of course, our vision should be to make safety a value, not a priority. When safety becomes a value, risks will not be tolerated, regardless of how protected and safe workers feel. Discuss:

Posted By Jonathan Breeze Gordon, I too struggled to finish reading your essay, if you add more paragraphs it will be a bit easier to read and may aid the flow of the discussion. But in answer to your first question, yes - I believe too many safeguards can encourage risk taking behaviour in individuals. Take climbing for example; it is split into several disciplines, of which we can consider three: Soloing - where the individual completes a route with only a chalkbag, boots and no protective gear. Risk taking behaviour by the climber is very low because they have to know their personal limits and there is no backup. Consequently the level of difficulty of the climb taken is within the capabilities of the individual. Trad Climbing - where a leader and second complete a route using protective gear and the leader is responsible for placing protection in the form of chocks and slings while the second belays the rope. The second then follows the route up and removes the protection as he or she ascends. Risk taking behaviour by the team is low because any backup they have is subject to the frailties of the team. Consequently the level of difficulty of the climb tends to be higher but usually at the limits of the weaker climbing partner. Sport Climbing - where the leader and second ascend a pre-bolted route and have no responsibility for placing the protective gear, merely for ensuring they clip in as they climb. Risk taking behaviour tends to be a lot higher as the team have greater (although occasionally misplaced) confidence in the pre placed bolts. Consequently the level of difficulty of the climb is far higher than usual and it is expected that one or both of the climbers may fall off at difficult points, the reward being the satisfaction of finally overcoming the crux manouver. I can easily see how this behaviour can be mimicked in the workplace.

Posted By Gordon Thelwell Are we more likely to take risks if we feel protected? Do safety belts, air bags, and anti-lock brakes lead to more risky driving, for instance? This is one of the most controversial questions in the field of safety. It's an issue many safety professionals ignore or deny. Obviously, the notion that personal protective equipment could encourage risky behaviour is extremely repugnant. But we need to explore this issue: Do we compensate -adjust our behaviour- for perceptions of safety? In recent years, the issue of compensating for safety has been given several different labels, including risk homeostasis, danger compensation, risk-offsetting behaviour, and perverse compensation. Whatever the label, the basic idea of risk compensation is quite simple and straightforward. People are presumed to change their behaviour to compensate for changes in perceived risk. If a job is made safer with machine guards or the use of PPE, employees might perceive less risk and actually work more dangerously. This idea certainly seems intuitive. In fact, I bet every member here has experienced the phenomenon. I clearly remember the increased risks I took when wearing a standard ice hockey goalie outfit. With the protective helmet and shoulder pads, I'd willingly throw my body at another player or leap high to catch a puck. I didn't perform these behaviours until perceiving security from the personal protective equipment. So how can the phenomenon of risk compensation be denied? Research findings The notion of risk compensation made its debut among safety professionals following the theorizing and archival research of a University of Chicago economist, Dr. Sam Peltzman. Peltzman systematically compared vehicle crash statistics before (1947-1956) and after (1966-1972) the regulated installation of safety engineering innovations in vehicles, including seat belts, energy absorbing steering columns, padded instrument panels, penetration-resistant windshields, and dual braking systems. As predicted by risk compensation theory, Peltzman found that these vehicle-manufacturing safety standards did not reduce the frequency of crash fatalities per miles driven. Perhaps the most convincing evidence of risk compensation was that the cars equipped with safety devices were involved in a disproportionately high number of crashes. Peltzman's findings have been criticized on a number of counts, primarily statistical; but they did stimulate a number of follow-up investigations. Dr. John Adams of University College, London, UK, for example, compared traffic fatality rates between countries with and without safety belt use laws. His annual comparisons (from 1970 to 1978) showed dramatic reductions in fatal vehicle crash rates after countries introduced seat belt use laws. Taken alone, this data would lend strong support to the seat belt legislation. However, the drop in fatality rates was even greater in countries without safety belt use laws. These studies compared risk behaviours across large data sets. Behavioural scientists call this a between-group design, and it can only indirectly test the occurrence of risk compensation. Since the theory predicts that individuals take more chances after perceiving an increase in safety or security, it can only be tested by comparing the same group of individuals under different conditions. Behavioural science researchers call this a within-subject design. Most within-subject tests of risk compensation theory have been restricted to simulated laboratory investigations. This is because within-subject observations under different risk conditions are time consuming and quite difficult to pull off in a real-world situation. One such study was conducted by Dr. Fredrick Streff and myself in 1987. To conduct this research we built an oval clay go-kart track (about 100 meters in circumference) and equipped a 5-hp go-kart with an inertia reel-type combination shoulder-lap safety harness. Subjects were told to drive the go-kart around the track quickly, but at a "comfortable" speed. The 56 subjects were either buckled or unbuckled in the first of two phases of 15 driving trials. After the first phase, the safety condition was switched for half the subjects. That is, the safety belt was unbuckled for subjects previously buckled up, or the belt was used by subjects who previously did not use it. The speed and accuracy of each subject's driving trial were systematically measured. Following the first and second phases (of 15 trials each), the subjects completed a brief questionnaire that assessed their perceived risk while driving the go-kart. The between-subject comparisons showed no risk compensation. That is, the subjects who used the safety belt for all trials did not drive faster than subjects who never used the safety belt. And, the perceptions of risk were not different across these groups. On the other hand, the within-subject differences did show the predicted changes in risk perception and behaviour. That is, subjects reported feeling safer when they buckled up, and subsequently drove the go-kart significantly faster than subjects who used the safety belt during both phases. The subjects who took off their safety belts reported a significant decrease in perceived safety, but this change in risk perception was not reflected in slower driving speeds (compared to drivers who never buckled up in the go-kart). Our go-kart study was later followed up in the Netherlands using a real car on real roads. Specifically, habitual, "hard-core" non-users of safety belts buckled up at the request of the experimenter. Compared to measures taken when not using a safety belt, these buckled-up drivers drove faster, followed more closely behind vehicles in front of them, changed lanes at higher speeds, and braked later when approaching an obstacle. I'm convinced from personal experience and reading the research literature that risk compensation is a real phenomenon. Safety implications So what does this mean for injury prevention? First, the off-setting or compensating behaviour doesn't negate the benefits of safety protections. Although football players increase risky behaviours when suited up, they sustain far fewer injuries than they would without the PPE. More importantly, Professor Gerald Wilde, the leader in risk homeostasis theory and research, says safety excellence cannot be achieved through top-down rules and mandates. Under these conditions, some people only follow the rules when they are supervised and might take greater risks when they feel "free." Such behaviour is predicted by risk compensation theory. As the title of his 1994 book, "Target Risk," indicates, Wilde advocates that safety interventions need to reduce the level of risk people are willing to tolerate. This requires a change in values. Wilde claims that improvements in safety cannot be achieved through training, engineering or enforcement. In his words, "the extent of risk taking with respect to safety and health in a given society, therefore, ultimately depends on values that prevail in that society, and not on the available technology" (Wilde, 1994, p. 223). This means, of course, our vision should be to make safety a value, not a priority. When safety becomes a value, risks will not be tolerated, regardless of how protected and safe workers feel. Discuss:

Posted By Frank Hallett Too philosophical for me. Some people will be inherently greater inclined to expose themselves [in the nicest possible way] to greater levels of risk than others. This does not necessarily mean that they are at greater risk though. The study of individual and group behaviours is complex and conclusions often seem to be biased as much by the study group as by the stuiers. Dead boring bit now. Training alone doesn't make a good "anything"! we all know people who are very well trained yet seem to be perpetually being disciplined for some indiscretion - they don't apply their training as it is meant to be. Something else to consider along with that; something that used to be called "aptitude2 [aren't I a dinosaur?] is fundamental to the safest application of safe behaviours in potentially threatening environments. Now for a contoversial thought - I sometimes wonder if the most really threatening environments aren't actually the most boring ones. Frank Hallett

Posted By Sean Fraser An interesting debate, and a topic I have been propounding for some time now. I had noticed, especially in the oil industry, that there were individuals who, once they had put their PPE on, believed themselves to be invincible and that bullets would bounce off them. As an industry, it is probably one of the most persistent in ensuring that people wear PPE, and yet the incident rates have not changed for several years. People are still injured and killed (although the levels are much lower than they used to be). How could that be if they were being protected? It is a clear example of why PPE is at the bottom of the hierarchy of risk control. And making tools safer does not automatically mean they will be used safely! I have had the discussion regarding the improved safety of vehicles with many people now and they all recognise the phenomenon, especially regarding ABS brakes as they find that people are now more likely to brake sharply and with less warning in the belief that they cannot skid (a fallacy in any case). This behaviour increases the risk both to themselves and the immediate road users around them. Many are probably not even conscious of their poor driving technique and would be amazed if you pointed it out to them, yet they probably feel that their driving has not changed over the years. This suggests that the effect is subconscious. Earlier in the year I put up an article from a website (link kindly supplied by another forum user here but I have now forgotten where) that suggested that to handle COSHH safely, you should think naked - if you had nothing, not even clothes, would you handle substances in the same way as you currently do (the substances in question being paints)? But as was stated above, the subject of human behaviour is highly complex, with numerous influences directing how people respond to stimuli as well as physiological ones. A good example is how people react in emergencies - some take charge, some freeze, some wait for instruction and some act as they were trained to do. This is typical behaviour and will likely be experienced in every occasion, even more so if the event is truly unprepared for. What we cannot accurately predict is WHO will react in these ways! Training is only ever one element. Procedures another. Effective management, a sense of team work, a degree of discretion - all these help. But ultimately, it is attitude and culture that will determine if safety is something to value and apply. And yes - anyone who says safety is their highest priority really means their priority can change tomorrow!