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Posted By FJ
For those interested (including construction colleagues- see report) the "final" HSE report on the recent outbreak is out- see their web site.
Anyone like to comment on how we can protect ourselves from a repeat?
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Posted By Merv Newman
How about a howling mob and flaming torches at midnight à la Freakenstein.
A few claps of thunder and the odd lightening bolt would come in handy for dramatic effect.
Perhaps the NFU would cater. Beefburgers ?
Merv
And no, I am not seriously advocating such extremes of civil disturbance. (which conceivably could result in a few ASBOs being handed out)
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Posted By Robert K Lewis
Several interseting points arise for me in this.
1) The government is shouting loudly about all it has done since the event and how well it responded to the breach. It does not however talk much about the tight budgetary controls exerted that led to poor maintenance regimes - The drain was known to be leaking for at least 4 years by some accounts. Is this not the frequent response of many companies in the wake of an H&S breach?
2) The regulator was also a client with an interest in the IAH continuing work and was also aware of the drain leak. Conflicts of interest lead to poor regulation - can the HSE and HSC withstand such situations in the future?
3) The confusion over maintenance is an oft repeated situation and it is a warning to all to ensure that they know what they are responsible for controlling.
4) Methods of ememrgency cleaning were not fully assessed for risk before the task was done. How often do we assess in retrospect to justify what was done?
Bob
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Posted By FJ
Thanks Bob that's just the sort of thing I was looking for- feeling ultra sorry for the farms involved- how realistic would it be to clean the tires of lorries leaving a bio. site and how on earth could you realistically do it (the old foot baths at airports enlarged?)
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Posted By Robert K Lewis
It is actually not that difficult if you really want to do it - it is called a jet washer filled with disinfectant solution. There are many types in use on construction sites including some drive thu versions. Do a google and you will find a number that recycle the wash water.
Bob
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Posted By FJ
Would such a system have worked fully here?
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Posted By Robert K Lewis
No because the government would not have funded the maintenance of it I would guess, based on current budgetary controls - 4 years minimum for a broken drain known to carry live virus.
Bob
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Posted By FJ
So how could that be solved?- sort of Corporate Manslaughter with interest or is there a civil case against the Government pending (in which case we couldn't continue discusing of course)!
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Posted By David Bannister
It's interesting that both this outbreak and the Scottish explosion seemed to have a leaking underground pipe as a cause - normally seen as a concern for environmental practitioners but less so for H&S bods with no Env responsibility.
Maybe lessons to be learned then?
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Posted By D H
This incident, along with the Stockwell event now put underground pipe leaks in the "reasonably foreseeable" risk category and needs to be considered in all work places.
The government in the bio scare case seems to have gotten its "reasonably practicable" calculations wrong.
However, the potential of a bigger escape from a bio lab is unthinkable - pandemic possibilities?
SO - "potential" is the key word.
Ok the Stockwell disaster killed 9 poor souls and left many others suffering severe grief and possible hardship. A fine of 400K was deemed sufficient.
A bio leak could potentially kill many many more. And the effects of heavy rain and flooding will expose other weaknesses.
Can we now expect the HSE or LA to take positive action on the bio leak or will this be swept under the carpet?
I personally do not expect to hear much more about this incident because of the status of the "guilty" parties
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Posted By Pete48
Same old, same old stuff in this report.
PTW,SSOW,engineering maintenance,finance, confusion over ownership, control of contractors, discipline in record keeping.
Now would someone care to remind where have I heard those causes before? Ah yes, I remember all the way back to.... the mists of industrial accident history.
I am no longer as certain as I once was that we can actually prevent these types of organisational failure; which is not saying we shouldn't keep trying. But are we guilty of same old, same old stuff ourselves? Are we as safety people missing something that is not about competence or assessment or discipline or regulation or all the other bits we bring out in these post incident discussions?
Cynical or pragmatic, you decide.
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Posted By D H
Hi Pete
Same old, same old stuff in this report.
PTW,SSOW,engineering maintenance,finance, confusion over ownership, control of contractors, discipline in record keeping.
What I was trying to get across was that things that were ignored before, have now proved to be serious hazards, So we need to take them into account.
It is a management problem/ deficiency which only we - as Safety advisors have to get Management aware of their requirements.
And all employees in the workplace to be made aware of their rights under sect 7 of the act - a failure that in my opinion that is also a failure by management when they employ people.
As a trainer
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Posted By D H
I should have said as a trainer, I am exasperated at the amount of employees who do know of their rights under Sect 7 of the Act.
Also the amount of managers and supervisors I have put through IOSH Managing Safely who do not know what a risk assessment looked like before the course.
Also their responsibilities when delegating tasks.
When you look at their companies Safety Policy, you wonder----- wander ------wonder -------wonder!
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Posted By Pete48
Hi DH, yes of course you are right but I was challenging why it is that there is always something missing.
You see to me, leaks in underground pipes have been a foreseeable hazard since they were first planted and the means to protect, inspect and maintain are almost as old; talk about cat 4 bio-hazards and my brain explodes!
At Maryhill it wasn't the production process and all the alleged lack of good chemical process controls but the LPG supply that started the chain.
It is the repeatability of the failure modes irrespective of industry or undertaking that has drawn me to my point that perhaps prevention is not possible because we are human.
I was just idly wondering what the outcome might be if we accepted that fact for just a moment, would it change the way we approach things? But at that point then I must apologise for hijacking the thread.
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