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RayRapp  
#1 Posted : 26 January 2011 13:01:08(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
RayRapp

Following a report by the RSSB, I think it is about time industry sat up and took notice of an insidious trend for the willful under-reporting of accidents and incidents. The report confirms what many inside and outside the industry have known or suspected. Advertising LTI/LTA and RIDDOR rates causes non-reporting and a culture of fear amongst staff and sub-contractors. Remember, each non-reported accident equals a non-investigated accident! I now hope the HSE/RSSB go a step further by dissuading organisations from advertising incident rates by posters, certificates and perhaps using accident/incident data in project tenders. After all, these figures are often massaged by managers and drives the reporting of accident underground - so why be allowed to use them? Interested in your comments. Link to document: http://www.shponline.co....il-riddor-irregularities
Hall40714  
#2 Posted : 26 January 2011 13:57:54(UTC)
Rank: Forum user
Hall40714

I couldn't agree with you more. My company operates an American based reporting system and the amount of emails generated on the negative aspects rather than what we have learned is unbelievable. I am currently under review as the accident/incidents and near misses have shot through the roof since a training day I put together. I am being blamed for manufacturing results when all I'm doing is getting people to report. A good example of my companies reaction to a recent incident was as follows. The incident was a pheasant jumped in front of one of our vans traveling on the motorway in the inside lane. This cause the windscreen to cave in and shards of glass were expelled into the drivers eyes meaning a trip to hospital. The emails generated from this was what speed was he traveling at to cause such an incident, the sex of the bird as female pheasant's are lighter than male pheasant's, if the windscreen is designed to take such an impact (which meant several emails to the manufacturers) and as it happened on the motorway does that still count as at work. At no point did they ask if the driver was OK (which he was after a few days) but they made sure he was working the next day by having someone else pick him up. If this wasnt an accident its its truest form i have no idea what is
RayRapp  
#3 Posted : 27 January 2011 10:44:49(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
RayRapp

Hall, although we are like minded on this important subject it appears from the lack of any other responses we are in the wilderness - hey, ho.
KieranD  
#4 Posted : 27 January 2011 11:00:17(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Guest

While your 'hope' is not unreasonable, it is not clear how the 'dissuasion' you advocate will acutally happen without much, much greater attention to the research by the University of Strathclyde psychologists which underpinned the CIRAS system they designed for the railways. They went far beyond hoping and dissuasion to specify very clearly how patterns of thinking and behaviour can be shaped to avoid illlegitimate fear through a confidential system of reporting that works both finanically and in terms of risk control. The available evidence at the 2010 Railway SIG conference indicated that few leaders in the Railway Sector both understand and assimilate this research.
SteveL  
#5 Posted : 27 January 2011 11:23:01(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
SteveL

RayRapp "I now hope the HSE/RSSB go a step further by dissuading organisations from advertising incident rates by posters, certificates and perhaps using accident/incident data in project tenders. After all, these figures are often massaged by managers and drives the reporting of accident underground - so why be allowed to use them? Interested in your comments." I agree with what you are saying that they should not be used when tendering for work. But if you wish to be accredited to any construction related schemes then you have to show, accident rates and stats. To provide competence to contractor under CDM (appendix 4) this also requires accident stats. This is how your performance within H&S will be judged. This is a 2 edged sword, lose work or juggle figures and hope not caught out. What other way would you suggest that performance can be judged.
jay  
#6 Posted : 27 January 2011 12:16:46(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
jay

I personally feel that it is high time that RIDDOR/OSHA related data is not used a key/important criterion for assessing a contractors health & safety performance, especially when there is significant under-reporting. It may be better to use some leading indicators and ask tough questions regarding the RIDDOR data,especially what has been done to prevent a recurrence and can that be proved. We are a global speciality chemicals organisation, but the UK site is R & D plus office functions. My employer uses the US OSHA reporting system for Corporate reporting. We have not had a RIDDOR reportable since 2005 and the last OSHA reportable (for corporate stats) was in May 2009. Our corporate reporting includes contractors, irrespective whether permanently on site or otherwise Recently, we have had approximately a total of 70 Potential Hazards, Near Misses, Incidents and Accidents in a year. Although the overall trend is downward, there is no specific target as it is better for all this to be reported, proportionately investigated etc so that a recurrence can be prevented. We also got a huge rise in the numbers reported internally ( non-RIDDOR/OSHA) when we started the campaign for encouraging the reporting.
Yossarian  
#7 Posted : 27 January 2011 13:51:47(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
Yossarian

Ray, It's a culture not just confined to the Rail Industry. As mentioned on another topic, I came across it in the building products (manufacturing) industry a while back when I couldn't access sector specific incident rates. There appeared to be an unwillingness to share accident stats with anyone externally (including trade associations) for benchmarking purposes, in case the business was identified and lost subsequent supply contracts to the construction industry.
RayRapp  
#8 Posted : 27 January 2011 15:34:10(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
RayRapp

As Yossarian states, the under-reporting of incidents is not confined to just the railway industry. That said, most of the big players in construction, engineering etc also have rail divisions. Senior managers are so paranoid about accidents that they constantly invent means of reducing them. Not so bad in itself. However, the upshot of this is mandatory PPE and other interventions which are often very difficult to enforce, not to mention OTT in some instances. Clearly, the regulators need to act to stamp out under-reporting and they could be lobbied by institutions like IOSH. Not suggesting it will happen just like that. However, the use of accident statistics for accreditations, tenders and so on, proves very little, if anything, about the organisation. They only serve to encourage the dishonest massaging of accident stats, discouraging injured persons from reporting accidents and consequentaly a lack investigation. Enough good reasons for the regulators to get their teeth into. CIRAS is, or was, a good idea at the time when it was introduced in the late 90s. Things have moved on since and probably not so useful today. For example, it appears to have done little to prevent the under-reporting on the railways, in part, it was designed for.
BigRab  
#9 Posted : 27 January 2011 17:32:30(UTC)
Rank: Forum user
BigRab

quote=stevel] I agree with what you are saying that they should not be used when tendering for work. But if you wish to be accredited to any construction related schemes then you have to show, accident rates and stats. To provide competence to contractor under CDM (appendix 4) this also requires accident stats. This is how your performance within H&S will be judged. This is a 2 edged sword, lose work or juggle figures and hope not caught out. What other way would you suggest that performance can be judged.
Organisations should be judged on positive criteria, i.e. the training they have undertaken, the safety systems they have in place, the monitoring they have done, the consultation they have undertaken, the review of systems that have resulted from the consultation and monitoring process etc. etc. all of which must be backed up by documentary and anecdotal evidence. Counting accidents is only a measure of how often things have either gone wrong (in terms of management failure or simple human error) or a chain of unforeseen events have taken place. The sooner we get away from these negative measurements to more positive performance indicators the better. I am not holding my breath, it's always easier to go down the route of laying blame at someone's door rather that fixing the inherent problems in our management systems.
Bob Shillabeer  
#10 Posted : 27 January 2011 19:20:36(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
Bob Shillabeer

Ray, you seem to misunderstand what CIRAS was for. It was not for reporting accidents, its purpose was to enable railway employees/contractor empmoyees to report concerns about how safety is managed within a specific area or company. The CIRAS team is a body of individuals who guard thier independence very closely, not even allowing the boss into the office without prior appointment and when recieving information by phone always ask anyone who is not part of the team to leave the office while the conversation is undertaken. Often a little too guarded but it is a way of maintaing the confidentiality of the issues concerned. If someone is trying to report an accident or a current ongoing issue they are referred to thier own organisation as thier first point of reporting. Ifv the individual is not keen on speaking to the company CIRAS will take the information and pass it on to the relevant company but do not undertake any other action. I am somewhat at a loss as to why you think CIRAS is of less relevance these days as it was when it was first set up, do you have specific evidence to suggest it is not fulfilling its job?
SteveL  
#11 Posted : 27 January 2011 19:34:26(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
SteveL

Bigrab "The sooner we get away from these negative measurements to more positive performance indicators the better. I am not holding my breath, it's always easier to go down the route of laying blame at someone's door rather that fixing the inherent problems in our management systems." This would be a better way, it has taken me 5 yrs to get the directors to see the benefits of training and system improvements. They can now see the benefits, this has reduced our accident rate to well below the industry norm, not only in reportable but actual accidents and near misses. But when as a company you place these figures before PC, you have a Spanish inquisition. All's well when you can prove what you have placed before them, but it is frustrating.
RayRapp  
#12 Posted : 27 January 2011 20:54:32(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
RayRapp

Bob, I fully understand the purpose of CIRAS, but this thread is not about CIRAS. Indeed, I don't know why it was mentioned earlier. The thread is concerned with the wilful under-reporting of accidents and incidents in industry ie construction, rail, engineering etc. And how management are getting the plaudits for the reduction in LTIs/RIDDORS and using these massaged stats to their ill-gotten advantage via contract tenders etc. Can't be clearer than that, mate. However, if staff and sub-contractors are disinclined to report accidents/incidents this will have a knock-on effect in other areas. For example, reporting unsafe acts and conditions, lack of incident investigation. Yes, I know CIRAS is a confidential reporting system, but its main purpose I feel is within operational and rail maintenance in a unionised environment; which is not construction work per se. SteveL, some good and interesting observations and when I calm down I will make a suitable comment. Meanwhile, going down the pub.
Bob Shillabeer  
#13 Posted : 27 January 2011 20:57:54(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
Bob Shillabeer

Ray you are a good man really, thanks for reminding me to go down the pub. Have downloaded the RSSB document and will read it when I have time, hopefully tomorrow. In the mean time off to the club for a few beers.
KieranD  
#14 Posted : 28 January 2011 06:00:16(UTC)
Rank: Guest
Guest

Ray The very simple reason I drew attention to CIRAS arose from your reference to 'fear': CIRAS succeeded in addressing this issue. The reality is that safety professionals in the rail and other sectors continue to make little progress by closing their minds to relevant research about human factors. Pleading about 'hope' and 'dissuasiion' is no substitute for learning from relevant research, however difficiult that may be.
RayRapp  
#15 Posted : 28 January 2011 10:48:03(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
RayRapp

Kieran, with respect, I don't really know what your point is with regards to CIRAS. I'm not convinced CIRAS has completely succeeded in addressing the issue of 'fear' from reporting accidents and incidents, otherwise the RSSB report would not have articulated the following: 'Hundreds of workplace injuries were not declared by Network Rail over a five-year period because staff and contractors were fearful of the consequences if they reported them, an independent report has concluded.' Furthermore, it is not 'safety professionals' who have failed, but senior management who have failed to wake up and smell the coffee. They have been either misguided or content in believing that accident data has indicated that there are fewer incidents, which is clearly not the case and due to gross under-reporting. Again, I don't really understand your comments about 'learning from relevant research'. I and many of my colleagues are acutely aware of the issues emanating from under-reporting and massaging the stats. I have seen or been made aware of covering up accidents, bonuses paid to managers for not having an LTI/RIDDOR, threats made to staff if an accident occurred on their watch. It is these insidious practices which I am trying to draw attention to and has nothing to do with behavioral safety or research, which I am well acquainted with thank you.
Hall40714  
#16 Posted : 28 January 2011 13:53:59(UTC)
Rank: Forum user
Hall40714

Wow I go away for a few days and this topic goes way off point. RayRapp please correct me if I'm wrong but your aim was to discuss how fixating on accident rates etc has tainted the way accidents get reported. This is something as practioners, I would have thought we were united on. I always tell people I care less about the score as I do about the accident. The HSE even stated in an article I read somewhere that only 50% of the accidents are reported under RIDDOR. I am dealing with another case at present why an engineer stood up of his knees at work and is off for 5 days. imidiatley I have been told that this could have happened anywhere so its not an accident at work. So ok I start investigating he has never been off with a bad knee, his work is 40% on his knees and we don't supply knee pads. How can it be anything else but an accident at work. But again because it will be a RIDDOR and a LTI the vultures are circling trying to convince me that's its nothing to do with work and my American Bosses are the same. Surely its just better to say it is and implement the control measure identified. oh and before anyone start I had already assessed the risks 8 months ago when I joined the company and advised that the PPE was not suitable for the task however it was deemed not cost effective at the time.
Bob Shillabeer  
#17 Posted : 28 January 2011 14:00:46(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
Bob Shillabeer

Keiran, Human Factors is not something that has been pushed into the background as your report indicated. The RSSB has a departmental function which looks at Human Factors and is staffed by some very competent and professional individuals who take the matter very seriouisly. They produce a lot of research into human factors issues which has led to some qwuite inovative working methods and equipment. So to say Human Factors is not taken seriouisly is quite incorrect.
Corfield35303  
#18 Posted : 28 January 2011 17:08:54(UTC)
Rank: Forum user
Corfield35303

Interesting thread, is the problem to do with reward being linked to desired reductions in accident rates? It becomes a very key performance indicator indeed if money is involved! A pity, because lagging accident indicators should be a simple and very accurate (almost the ultimate) measure of safety performance, but as has been seen people end up hiding some accidents. And this is bad when a building company or contractor on a site does it, but when the national rail infrastructure provider is involved...????? A suggestion: should reward be somehow linked to leading indicators? For example hitting a certification requirement, or (and I concede its difficult) leadership standards, or hitting the H&S plan, or a positive (ORR/independant) audit outcome? ....and in the rail sector could reward be linked to the non-hideable aspects such as fatalities, SPAD's and derailments (attributable)? Does this almost gives a 'corporate' green light to what we all know already happens on a smaller scale?
Bob Shillabeer  
#19 Posted : 28 January 2011 17:23:46(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
Bob Shillabeer

Before we go off and talk about under reporting this needs to be put into a little bit of context. The accidents have been reported by Network Rail into the industry reporting system SMIS. The problem has been non reporting of RIDDOR reportables to the HSE. It is important to understand this is how Network Rail failed to advise the HSE of reportable accidents it does not mean they have not recorded or investigated the accidents.
RayRapp  
#20 Posted : 28 January 2011 17:29:46(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
RayRapp

Corfield Some good comments and ideas I wish to expand. Lagging indicators are the easiest, but not necessarily the best form of measurement in industry. This is compounded by virtue that good safety (ie no accidents, incidents, near misses etc) is not really measurable. In other words, health and safety requires many inputs but they are not immediately obvious, at least, not without a negative outcome. Staff and contractors should be proud of genuine stats which reveal good h&s performance. When these are aligned to incentives there is an opportunity for dishonesty. Furthermore, intimidation of people not to report an accident and blaming those, sometimes the victim, who are doing their best to manage h&s properly is the dark side of our industry.
Bob Shillabeer  
#21 Posted : 28 January 2011 18:38:39(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
Bob Shillabeer

It should be understood where the problem is. In the rail industry there is a system known as SMIS where accidents are recorded onto a national database which gives Network Rail and each train operating company access to input details of not only accidents to the individual but operational incidents such as SPADs, derailments and near misses. This provides the industry with a wealth of data in order to measure future improvements in safety performance (among other things). The question has been that Network Rail failed to report all notifiable accidents under RIDDOR. That is how performance and reward has not been found to be the basis for this problem, it is a matter of simply not reporting and nothing to do with bonuses etc.
RayRapp  
#22 Posted : 29 January 2011 09:43:01(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
RayRapp

Bob The issue of under-reporting of accidents and incidents is not just confined to NWR or even the railway industry. It is endemic in other project type industries. The drive by organisations to win or keep contracts partly through good health and safety performance is the kernel of the problem. I can assure you that there is both empirical and anecdotal evidence that incentives are given to staff for good health and safety performance. Nothing wrong with that as I have previously stated. However, when those incentives include bonuses and other rewards, then there is the opportunity for staff to be economical with the true facts about incidents. There is of course the issue of intimidation as well. That is reality my friend.
Bob Shillabeer  
#23 Posted : 29 January 2011 12:20:43(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
Bob Shillabeer

Ray, I totally agree there are many who fail to report accidents to RIDDOR, it is one of the weaknesses of any system which relies on someone who may be guilty of something to avoid telling on themselves, its human nature, perhaps thats what is wrong with RIDDOR. The original posting gave the impression that there was a history of not reporting or investigating accidemts on the railway. That is incorrect, they are reported and investigated in the vast majority of cases, just not reported under RIDDOR, which uis what RSSB's report was about so we need to be clear what the report was actually about, not investigating only recording. As to the point of bomuses and thier effect on H&S, that is a cultural issue that must be carefully managed when setting objectives to ensure there is no diliberate hidding if the true picture, human nature I'm afraid.
RayRapp  
#24 Posted : 30 January 2011 03:40:38(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
RayRapp

Bob, thanks for your last post. I don't wish to appear to keep disagreeing with you but, if you read the report from the SHP link it quite clearly states the under-reporting of 'accidents', and not just RIDDORs. I am not having a go at NWR, as these practices are not just confined to the rail industry. '...in the majority of cases, staff and contractors chose not to report accident events, owing to fear of reprisals – real or perceived – if they did so. Among the companies and individuals they employed, there was a strong belief they would be less likely to receive work if they reported a lost-time injury.'
Bob Shillabeer  
#25 Posted : 30 January 2011 20:57:25(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
Bob Shillabeer

Ray, I am about to read the RSSB report in full, all 99 pages of it. Have glanced at it quickly this afternoon but will study it in full and no doubt wish to raise some issues from it. The authors, Messrs Anson Jack, Colin Dennis, Huw Gibson, and Siona Pitman are all very knowledgable individuals and I look forward to reading it. How they make it 99 pages though fills me with wonder. Have no fear tghis one will go on for some days yet, and Ray I enjoy the little 'disagreements'
Bob Shillabeer  
#26 Posted : 30 January 2011 21:06:21(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
Bob Shillabeer

Ray have PMd you but your box is full and you will only recieve it if you free up some space.
RayRapp  
#27 Posted : 30 January 2011 21:28:00(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
RayRapp

Bob, I'm free...
Jim Tassell  
#28 Posted : 31 January 2011 13:07:20(UTC)
Rank: Forum user
Jim Tassell

Surely, if the government follow through on proposed changes to RIDDOR reporting, the problems of under-reporting will go away as there won't be much left to report....? So, the value of RIDDOR stats will be so far reduced as to be negligible. Sorry; just daydreaming.
John J  
#29 Posted : 31 January 2011 15:33:15(UTC)
Rank: Super forum user
John J

Jim Tassell wrote:
Surely, if the government follow through on proposed changes to RIDDOR reporting, the problems of under-reporting will go away as there won't be much left to report....? So, the value of RIDDOR stats will be so far reduced as to be negligible. Sorry; just daydreaming.
Jim, the advantage with seven days for reporting is that it reduces the likelihood of someone signing themselves off and affecting the figures. Any longer you would be seeing a doctor and getting a more realistic approach. I've seen many trivial accidents escalate to >3 day reportables and can, to a certain extent, understand why some companies are reluctant to report. My issue is not with reporting or recording accidents but how the data is received and used. Not many of us will have enough RIDDOR accidents to trend but may have enough minor accidents to analyse and ensure it's captured in upcoming audits/improvement plans. On the other side of the coin the HSE have enough data to begin to understand where there priorities lie. Is it tainted by under reporting? Probably to a certain extent but it's difficult to hide the major accidents that will inevitably be produced by this type of culture.
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