It is harsh, LFB was acting in a manner those though correct on the information those had at the time.

It's the ones who risk their own lives to save others I feel for. trying their very best, then get told basically its their fault all those people died

Originally Posted by: George_Young

It is harsh, LFB was acting in a manner those though correct on the information those had at the time.

It's the ones who risk their own lives to save others I feel for. trying their very best, then get told basically its their fault all those people died

To be fair the report praised the efforts of the fire fighters at the scene, their criticism focused on senior management and in particular the leader of the LFB. 

Originally Posted by: CptBeaky

It turns out that they already had knowledge of a previous fire that had spread up external cladding, but had not changed their procedures to take this into account.

They probably were unaware if it was the same cladding in use, and tbh the fire spread to the top within about 13 mins, fire crews probably took 5-10 mins to arrive.

I feel they are being made scape goats and there hasnt been much in the media about the owners, contractors or suppliers.  Is the full report available today?

Originally Posted by: craigroberts76

They probably were unaware if it was the same cladding in use, and tbh the fire spread to the top within about 13 mins, fire crews probably took 5-10 mins to arrive.

I feel they are being made scape goats and there hasnt been much in the media about the owners, contractors or suppliers.  Is the full report available today?

They told they people to stay inside for around 2 hours, despite it being very obvious that the cladding was burning. They followed their procedures, but the procedures were wrong. This isn't about blame, it is about ensuring it doesn't happen again.

If the Fire Service is above critisism then how can they improve? This in no way plays down what they do/did. They are all heroes for running towards danger instead of away from it. However we must not let that hero statement stand in the way of progress. If there is something they can/should do better, are we better to acknowledge that, rather than let people's lives be endangered through concerns of causing offense?

Many fire compartmentalised concrete tower blocks operate(d) a stay put policy in consequence of their original design & build risk assessment.

Many concrete tower blocks subsequently had various cladding systems applied to improve the energy efficiency and/or aesthetic.

In a generalisation any significant change to a structure or its use should be accompanied by a review of the existing Fire Risk Assessment.

look up beechmere in Crewe where I live, residential home for the elderly, wooden structure, no concrete compartments, no sprinkler system and yet they also had a stay put when it burnt down 2 months ago, luckily a local resident told the fire chief where he could put his stay put and went to get his nan out, then they decided to evacuate everyone.  150 rescued and no injuries or deaths,

You would never guess but the recommendations were spilt:

12 for high rise building owners

12 for the LFB

8 for all UK fire services

Yet the LFB get the bad press. It sells papers I suppose

BTW, the 'Stay Put' strategy is NOT a fire service procedure, but one orginationing from the 1960s CP building control process

A PARAPHRASED SUMMARY OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF 

PHASE 1

4) KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIALS IN HIGH RISE BUILDINGS

The owner & manager of every high rise premises, by law provide information to their local fire & rescue service in relation to design and materials used in external walls

Fire services ensure staff at all levels are able to understand & recognise risks with fires in external walls of such premises

5) 7(2)D VISITS (familiarisation) 

LFB review 72d arrangements 

LFB train crew managers to inspect high rise buildings in respect of the 72d (was 1id)

6)PLANS

Owner and manager of high rise premises, by law, provide plans to the local fire & rescue service

Owner and manager of high rise premises, by law, install premises information boxes for plans

7)LIFTS

Owner and manager of high rise presumes, by law, carry out regular inspections of firefighting lifts and report findings to the fire service on a monthly basis.

Owner and manager of high rise presumes, by law, carry out checks regular checks of firefighting lift switching mechanism and report findings to the fire service on a monthly basis

8) COMMS BETWEEN CONTROL ROOM AND FIREGROUND

LFB to review policies on comms between control room and Incident Manager 

LFB to ensure all above CM receive training in communicating with control room

LFB to ensure Control Room Officers above Ass Ops Manager rank receive training in communication with Incident Manager 

9) EMERGENCY CALLS

LFB policy be amended to separate callers into those trapped & those seeking advice

LFB to train CROs more effectively and regularly 

All fire services draw up plans to deal with large number of simultaneous fire survival calls 

All fire services develop systems to display fire survival calls at the control room & bridgehead

All fire services develop policies to manage a transition from ‘stay put’ to ‘get out’ (sic)

All fire services train control room staff to communicate a change of advice to callers

All fire services investigate measures to allow other control rooms taking calls to access appropriate information about the incident

Met Pol, LAS and LFB to improve protocols to ensure identical advice is given to callers

10) COMMAND & CONTROL

LFB to develop procedures to better control deployments and use of resources 

LFB to develop better procedures to debrief crews returning from deployment which enables such information to be made available to the Incident Manager.

LFB to develop better comms between the control room and Incident Manager - and the Bridgehead and Incident Manager 

11) EQUIPMENT

LFB to develop better comms between firefighters and Bridgehead in high rise incidents

12) EVACUATION

HM Govt to produce guidelines on carrying out evacuation of high rises, including disabled persons 

All fire services to develop plans for evacuating high rise residential buildings & train their staff to do so

Owner and manager of high rise premises, by law, draw up emergency plans and supplies those plans to fire service and in premises info boxes

Owner and manager of high rise premises, by law, prepare PEEPs (for disabled residents)

All fire & rescue service carry smoke hoods

15) INTERNAL SIGNAGE

Owner and manager of high rise premises, by law, clearly mark the floor number on landings on every floor

Owner and manager of any resident building with separate dwellings (of any size), by law, provide evacuation instructions in a manner the resident can understand 

16) FIRE DOORS

Owner and manager of high rise premises containing separate dwellings (whether high rise or not) urgently inspect their fire doors to ensure their compliance

Owner and manager of high rise premises containing separate dwellings (whether high rise or not), by law, to inspect fire doors and self closers to ensure compliance and in good condition 

Those whatever capacity who have responsibility for entrance doors to flats in buildings fitted with unsafe cladding, be required by law to ensure doors are compliant 

17) COOPERATION BETWEEN 999 SERVICES

Various recommendations for all 999 services to coordinate better

LFB to investigate systems so that they can see the Mets and LAS’s CAD logs

Steps be taken to ensure LFB and NPAS (National Police Air Service)  helicopters use the same encryption systems to allow LFB to view NPAS heli- link  (the Inquiry fails to allocate this action to any group)

Met and LFB to liaise to investigate improvement on casualty clearing and collection of information about survivors 

Originally Posted by: craigroberts76

look up beechmere in Crewe where I live, residential home for the elderly, wooden structure, no concrete compartments, no sprinkler system and yet they also had a stay put when it burnt down 2 months ago, luckily a local resident told the fire chief where he could put his stay put and went to get his nan out, then they decided to evacuate everyone.  150 rescued and no injuries or deaths,

Interesting that the on-line BBC report states:

The incident commander chose to override a "stay put" policy at the premises, which would have required residents to remain in their apartments and be evacuated on a phased basis.

Lee Shears, head of protection with the fire service, said: "It's clear that the fire wasn't behaving in the way that we would expect, and I must praise his swift and decisive actions in ordering the immediate evacuation of residents.

"His decision undoubtedly saved lives."

I knew the building fairly well (or the pre refurbished Grenfell) as it was on my ground for 10 years when I was stationed at the local fire station

It has a firefighting lift and the first crews in tried to operate it. From the report, it seems to be an Express drop down lift key that was used but it failed to call the lift or switch it to firefighting mode. The lift was used by some crews, but when in 'passenger' mode. I believe it was abandoned when the job got going too well.

My view is that 'Stay Put' works well when a fire orginates or is contained to a limited number of dwellings. The fire resisting construction of individual residential units will hold the fire to the flat of origin - ok with spread rarely upward via windows of flats above. The holding of the fire in one unit allows the fire service time to arrive and splash some wet stuff on the hot stuff and get home in time for tea and medals.  Therefore for 99% of dwelling fires, stay put is fine

I went to a fire at Grenfell years before which was out of the window(s). It left a scorch mark on the concrete for months before scaffolding was erected and repairs made. That of course was before some pillock wrapped it in plastic. Neighbouring blocks at the Edward Woods Estate had vented fires and a fire Trellick Towers (at 33 floors was the tallest council block in the UK save some awful blocks in Glasgow) lept up 3 floors before we got it - but this was flat-to-flat, so slower spread than a cladding job

To be fair, the LFB probably should have abandoned 'Stay Put' earlier than they did. It was clear the job wasnt contained to a limited number of units. But its all very easy with Daily Mail hindsight, but on the night this job redefines the word 'unprecedented'. But lets put some context on this - as the LFB rescued 65 persons over a 7 hour rescue period in the most challenging  environment imaginable. Thats 65 men women and children walking around today because of the LFB's superhuman efforts

The narrow staircase is now well known and overcrowding would have been an issue in a general evac was ordered. Plus how to you tell those trapped to try and leave? The LFB would have had some phone numbers, but very few tower blocks have a PA or any other communal alarm.  But notwithstanding these issues, an evac earlier would have been a good move

I have two grumbles about the report:

1) Phase 1 should have covered the construction project and associated areas. This would mean that now that the first phase on the inquiry has reported, work could now start on addressing the building regs and COPs that would prevent similar errors. It would also mean those 400 blocks waiting in limbo to see whether & how to deal with their dangerous ACM cladding could now get on with it

I wrote to the Inquiry months ago and asked why the response is being scrutinised first & not the build? They send a general templated reply which failed to answer my question. Its a tragedy the fire service part of the report has been published first, thereby delaying life changing amendments by 2+ years. 

2) The media - press, tv, radio and internet - have focused on one part of this report and have not mentioned the majority of the findings do not specifically apply to the London Fire Brigade. This is unhelpful but sells newspapers I suppose

Is the report a diversionary whitewash or a cock up? Leaving the building part alone is a bloody scandal and Moore-Bick will (IMO) have blood on his hands if we get another serious cladding fire whilst he fiddles about with frankly peripheral stuff which is not likely to save a single life

Originally Posted by: firesafety101

"How do you tell those trapped to leave" is a very good question Messy.

You will no doubt be aware that fire alarms are not allowed inside tower blocks, not even individual flats.  The reason is that the blocks are designed to prevent fire spread from flat to flat and if a single fire alarm sounds every resident in the building may decide to evacuate, thus causing blocked stairway, potential for panic and injuries when people slip/trip and/or fall on their way down.

All domestic homes in Scotland by law will require smoke/heat detectors by 2021, including High Rise Buildings.

I have to dissagree with you rational and beleive that these will undoutfully save lives, especially in high rise buildings.

Smoke/heat detectors are the norm in individual dwellings but not in communal areas within the block. The reason for this is because they would be too easy for vandals to activate or at least interfere with them and would would be more trouble than they are worth.

Originally Posted by: toe

All domestic homes in Scotland by law will require smoke/heat detectors by 2021, including High Rise Buildings.

I have to dissagree with you rational and beleive that these will undoutfully save lives, especially in high rise buildings.

Originally Posted by: RayRapp

Smoke/heat detectors are the norm in individual dwellings but not in communal areas within the block. The reason for this is because they would be too easy for vandals to activate or at least interfere with them and would would be more trouble than they are worth.

There is some rational with this thinking, which is understandable. However, my view is that there should be automatic fire detection (not manual call points) in lobby areas and plant rooms of high-rise residential buildings. My view on this is that:

1. there are often plant rooms, laundry rooms and resident’s storage areas (cages) in lobby areas. And sometimes central battery systems for the emergency lights that have lead acid batteries that can emit explosive hydrogen gases.
2. most high-rise building have secure door entry systems and often CCTV installed.

Though, the question to be asked is; who should be alerted to the activation of the alarm in the lobby and what action should be taken and by whom. I have to add that in my experience in Scotland, fire stopping between floors in many of these buildings is often poor.

There may be one member/ex member of LFB sitting on a twitchy bum.  During the signing off process and before any refurbishment is carried out the list of responsible people who have to sign off and issue a certificate includes the Fire Officer for the FRS whose area the refurbishment will take place.

I have worked as CDM Consultant for a firm of architects and one of my roles was to write and issue the Pre Construction Plan.  The information gained for this includes drawings and details of the project.  Certificates required include the fire officer's and Building Control.

One of my projects was a refit of a store and installation of a mezzanine floor with stairway and passenger lift inside the store and a fire exit at the rear that led directly to outside the building.  The agreed fire exit consisted of a hole in the rear wall and a Spiral Staircase leading from the first floor to the ground.

As was my duty to review the documents I realised that the spiral staircase will not be suitable for everyone as the mezzaning floor was to be accessed by young and old, people with prams/pushchairs, disabled persons and pets including dogs of all sizes and other animals that may be walking or carried.  The mezzanine was built for a Veterinary practice above a pet store.  Spiral staircases are not recommended for use as fire exits.

I informed my views about the spiral staircase to the top architect and he told me it had been signed off by Building Control.  I repeated my concerns and explained about the type of person who may need to use the exit, including their animals but he told me in no uncertain terms the Fire Officer had approved and signed the certificate.

That is where I left the argument and still have copies of our email conversation.

I wonder if a similar conversation was had between fire officer and designer/building management for Grenfell Tower or did the fire officer simply sign and issue the certificate without looking into the type of cladding and its properties and potential for burning.  Perhaps the fire officer was given incorrect details about the cladding as there is more than one similar type, one burns and the other doesn't.

We will probably find out during the second stage.

Originally Posted by: firesafety101

Perhaps the fire officer was given incorrect details about the cladding as there is more than one similar type, one burns and the other doesn't.

My understanding (which will be confirmed at the second stage) is that they used an alternative, cheaper, cladding than what was in the design. Whether this was done with the client's knowledge or not will be interesting.

Originally Posted by: Roundtuit

I think it appropriate to mention that this is only the first of several Investigations.

Our forums, and in particular this public one, are meant to avoid speculation particularly where there is an on-going enquiry or potential prosecution.

I don't think there is any more speculation on this forum than in the media in general. In any case, sub judice only applies to legal proceedings and not a public enquiry.

The police have conducted interviews under caution.

The relatives are hoping to see persons in the dock.

Yes this may be one public enquiry, unfortunately it is not the end of the whole processes.

We must not stay silent with our views which fall outside evidence given to the Police or Inquiry.  I went to Firex - a large fire safety exhibition in London - a few weeks after the Grenfell tragedy. A panel had been hastily drawn up to discuss the fire safety matters arising from the disaster. Frankly, I was not expecting much as those presenting would surely have their hands tied by subjudicy etc

That was NOT the case. The experts gathered gave their vews with some emotion and vigour. After all, as they spoke, many of the 72 bodies were still in situ. The biggest message for that discussion was that the fire safety industry must not rest until the necessary changes are in place. Some of the changes discussed have ben recommended by experts for years, but ignored by Govt.

I am still angry that phase 1 didnt look at the project and building design control. This is where the real cause of the deaths and ongoing risk lies.

There is a huge demand for new greener products new building design and no more so than with insulation materials, products and systems. Scores are introduced each year and they are getting more complicated. Meanwhile the Govts Approved Document B - the part of the building regs that relates to fire safety - had not been reviewed or reprinted in over a decade. How can those seeking advice be sure of up to date or relevant information?

For context, some countries re issue their fire regs building codes annually, but not here

Some suggest that kicking this bulding regs bit of the Inquiry down the road by 4 or 5 years allows for the Govt Ministers responsible at the time of the fire to have moved elsewhere or resigned. 

They might say that, but I couldnt possibly comment!!!

How do you know what has or has not been given to the police as evidence?

It is only when someone is invited to defend what they did or did not do will such evidence come to light.

Casting an aspersion in public about what the client was aware of has the possibility to distract from the actual evidence yet to be presented.

No problem discussing how weak our standards are just asking we be considerate enough not to allow some legal eagle a get out to let the possibly guilty walk Scott free.

Regarding kicking the date - it is only this week a court date has been set for what will be a corporate manslaughter case for the Bosely wood floor mill explosion that occured in July 2015  

Edited by user 10 November 2019 14:49:03(UTC)  | Reason: kicking the date