Originally Posted by: A Kurdziel

I do take issue with the writer’s description of the RR (FSO) as deregulation. They don’t seem to realise that this law clearly made the FRA the centre piece of fire safety. The old FPA was a very prescriptive document under which the fire service checked off that the building had certain features which were designed to mitigate the outbreak of fire (eg means of raising the alarm, protected fire escape routes, means to fight the fire) rather that a goal based approach which is about stopping the fire breaking out in the first place. The people best placed to do this are the user/occupiers of the building in question. 

Well said. So many people are using this 'deregulation' description when referring to The Fire Safety Order. Its nonsense as the FSO is by far an improvement over the old FPA for reasons given by RayRapp.

Its also worth noting that the Fire Precautions Act and its cumbersome Fire Certificates did not apply to residental flats, whereas the common parts of the same buildings now are covered under the FSO. Plus Article 31 (Prohibition Notices) apply to any part of any building including flats, where access to those flats is the subject of an Art 31 Notice

Is the FSO perfect? Of course not. In the fire safety world, only I am perfect - so I hope they dont change the legislation too much.

The fire service must retail its enforcement role, but if the recommendations of this failed Inquiry is anything to go by, the fire service may well have a larger - almost managing agent role. Moore - Bick has suggested that managers of high rise flats test their firefighting lifts 'regularly' (they already do!) and report the status of their firefighting lifts to the fire service on a monthly basis.

So its a slide back in time to when the fire service were responsible for fire safety and not the owner/occupier. That is a very poor decision and I hope HM Govt kick it into touch.

Can you imagine how many blocks the London Fire Brigade will be managing? More expense for the tax payer!

Reading through this report it is clear that, as always in major disasters, there were multiple management failings: indeed some of them are foreshadowed in the passionate piece posted by Steve above. Firefighters weren't trained in what to do if containment failed, well, why not? Internal LFB documents had identified the likely failure mode at Grenfell in 2016, but frontline fire crew weren't adequately informed. The CFO spoke of the LFB's policy in these terms 'The Commissioner described many of the aspects of the building which the policy requires them to examine during a visit as "incorrect" and "not realistic."17 If that is so, it is not clear how the LFB came to produce such a flawed policy.' in the words of the report.

There's loads of stuff in here we as H&S practitioners need to consider. It is not a hatchet job on front-line forefighters; they are exonerated repeatedly for what seem to have been failings in management in LFB: failure to learn, failure to provide adequate training and procedures, and above all a disastrous failing of imagination. Don't read what the daily rags are saying, read the actual report.

Phase 1 already identified fainlings on the part of the other players, such as failure to meet the requirements of Part B. But once the fire started, LFB crews found themselves in a situation which they had not been trained to manage. They should have been, Grenfell was reasonably foreseeable and LFB managers should have foreseen it; a least, that's what the report concludes,

John

I suspect on conclusion of the enquiry it will become established there were industry wide failings and Grenfell Tower was just one very unfortunate example of these failings - it could have easily happened elsewhere. There will be a host of issues around building regulations, fire legislation, fire cladding testing and approval, etc.

It is only natural for the survivors to look for retribution and justice for these failings. However, from previous examples, I suspect the authorities will have great difficulty in identifying individual and corporate failings which were directly attributable to the disaster.

Messey, just seen the news article - shocking. I am no fire expert but it clearly looks like the outside of the top of the block (presumably cladding or wood) was combustible material.

Why are we so slow to learn from previous events and put proper measures in place?

The fire is in the cladding - the BRE testing post Grenfell was for the cladding system - NO ONE has bothered with compartmentalisation between properties OR that many contractors omit fire stops (BBC report on Persimmon housing at the start of the year) OR that no one examines a build against the plans any more because the clerk of works was a cost rather than a benefit.

The cladding system could have been safe IF PROPERLY INSTALLED according to plan.

FireSafety 101 - the police HAVE questioned the supply chain and seized documentation. A number of employees remain under strict instruction on what they may or may not say dependent upon potential court action.

CptBeaky, this does not make any sense. Fire stopping is used between compartments and voids to prevent a fire spreading throughout the building. If the cladding was a known risk then there is even more of a good reason to carry out fire stopping! 

Miss quoted unfortunately - "the fire was in the cladding" was to do with the Bolton student accommodation fire.

Originally Posted by: RayRapp

CptBeaky, this does not make any sense. Fire stopping is used between compartments and voids to prevent a fire spreading throughout the building. If the cladding was a known risk then there is even more of a good reason to carry out fire stopping! 

https://assets.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/HAR00006585_Email%20Between%20Ricky%20Kay%2C%20Ben%20Bailey%2C%20Kevin%20Lamb%2C%20Mark%20Stapley%2C%20Sue%20Sheppard%2C%20Simon%20Lawrence%2C%20Simon%20O%27Connor%2C%20Ray%20Bailey%2C%20Daniel%20Anketell-Jones%20dated%2026.03.15%20-%2027.03.15%20r.pdf

That is the email chain. It seems they thought there was no point in spending extra on firestopping because they knew that the cladding would go up quickly anyway, spreading the fire. Instead they were more concerned with whether the fire would spread internally.

Maybe I am interpreting it wrong

Originally Posted by: CptBeaky

Originally Posted by: RayRapp

CptBeaky, this does not make any sense. Fire stopping is used between compartments and voids to prevent a fire spreading throughout the building. If the cladding was a known risk then there is even more of a good reason to carry out fire stopping! 

https://assets.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/HAR00006585_Email%20Between%20Ricky%20Kay%2C%20Ben%20Bailey%2C%20Kevin%20Lamb%2C%20Mark%20Stapley%2C%20Sue%20Sheppard%2C%20Simon%20Lawrence%2C%20Simon%20O%27Connor%2C%20Ray%20Bailey%2C%20Daniel%20Anketell-Jones%20dated%2026.03.15%20-%2027.03.15%20r.pdf

That is the email chain. It seems they thought there was no point in spending extra on firestopping because they knew that the cladding would go up quickly anyway, spreading the fire. Instead they were more concerned with whether the fire would spread internally.

Maybe I am interpreting it wrong

I think it's hard to say, as we don't have the background and details of the question that was originally asked regarding fire stopping.

It reads to me like there was some confusion between what constitutes cavity barriers and fire stopping between some of the parties, which as you know are different things.

Reading between the lines, I don't think the guy at the end of the email chain was suggesting that fire stopping wasn't required in the building. I would imagine that he was implying that cavity barriers of the appropriate rating were sufficient and that replacing them with fire stopping of 120 minutes would be ridiculous.

That said, I think he chose his words poorly and should have probably explained himself better.

A window, door or wall all have vertical and horizontal planes. Whilst flames typically rise driven by convection fire itself can travel sideways which is why fire stopping should be installed in both planes.

A well built construction would see barriers completely surrounding a window frame.