As some may know, I work in the window industry. This is not really relevant to to H&S of my work, but it is related. We are about to start manufacturing of a new type of window. These windows automatically open when they detect smoke. The reasoning is that "more people die of smoke inhalation than the actual fire". This sounds ridiculous to me, akin to arguing that more people die of seatbelt injuries than flying through windscreens. It is a well known building company that is asking for them, and they intend to install them on stairwells. Wouldn't they just create a nice supply of oxygen to a fire?

Are there any fire safety experts on here that want to comment on this. Is it as silly as it seems? Or is there method to this madness?

Sounds like AOV (automatic opening vents) to me, which is definitely a good idea and a basic requirement in many types of buildings.

There is a difference between stairwells / escape routes and other rooms.

Smoke buildup in stairwells is a serious concern and can compromise an evacuation. A way of venting the smoke out is necessary here.

However, if a fire is started in a room, that's not part of the escape route, then the most important thing there is to limit the oxygen feed and close the windows.

Its not exactly to prevent breathing in fumes, but more to do with keeping escape routes clear to allow a safe escape route.

Building Regulations recommend there should be a vent of at least 1 sq.m. open area at the head of the stairs. The vent should be operated automatically by smoke detection, unless the top storey of the building is a maximum of 11m above ground level in which case it can be a manual vent operated by a control at fire service access level.

With the massive increase in residential flats being built, the market for staircase vents is huge - so lucrative to be involved in.

I was a firefighter many years ago with Grenfell Tower on our 'ground'. Each staircase lobby had a smoke detector surrounded and protected from physical damage by a powder coated steel anti vandal cage. Many of those cages has their plastic coating burnt off by yobsholding lighters up the smoke detector trying to force an evacuation, not knowing only the AOVs would open 20+ floors above them!!!

It was sad to read in the Grenfell Inquirey (Phase 1) report, that a new enhanced ventilation system had been installed, but was soon completly overwhelmed by the amount of smoke it was 'asked' to clear. To be fair, no venting system would have coped, but it was reading that section of the report that made me recall the multiple burnt detector cages :(

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-55318525

All systems must be correctly assembled according to plan unlike Les Dawson on the piano who "knew all the right notes, just not necessarily in the right order". Sort of proves the comment about buildings being "thrown up".

As Messey says there is coverage for this under UK Building Regulations (Approved Document part B refers).

It allows for segregated areas to be ventilated - the building hardware coming under various standards including BS EN 12101-1 (multiple part publication) "Smoke and heat control systems"

NOTE: there are specific European fire tests for such devices over an above whether or not it is flammable

Originally Posted by: stevedm

...not a fire expert but just started and you all know my research and comments on Grenfell....here's a questions that would need to be backed up by some research...as the window frame failed (I know, amongst other items that were not installed correctly) if it has been automatic opening would it have prevented/ reduced the likelihood the lining and then the ACM and therefore intensity and spread of the fire? ...I would be interested in seeing the datasheet for the window if that is possible?  :)

Automatic opening windows or failed windows would have led to Grenfell. Neither one is better or worse than the other when the building has been clad in combustible materials.

It was NOT the failed window that was a significant contributary factor in Grenfell, it was the cladding system, both the  materials used and the way the system had been installed

As I said in my previous post, proof of that concept is the fire I attended in the 80s which caused an upper window to fail & flames to leave the building causing blackening and spalling to the non combustible wall of the building. If Grenfell had not be clad with this system, the recent fire (like the one I went to there) would have been a 'bread and butter' roouine job, dealt with easily and would have hardly made the local paper 

Originally Posted by: stevedm

if it has been automatic opening would it have prevented/reduced the likelihood the lining and then the ACM and therefore intensity and spread of the fire?

Someone would need to compare the specifications for the actual windows installed to the specifications for building hardware associated with fire and smoke control. Then you get in to the question of the system "build" i.e. what the frame is installed within and how the various components have been installed.

Without the ignition source, that first domino to topple, there would have been no incident - you can still purchase plastic backed fridge/freezers, some manufacturers now advertise as a Unique Selling Point their metal backed variants.

The inquiry is still on-going and should be allowed to reach its conclusions based upon what was used, how it was used and what standards were applicable at the time.

One thing that is very abhorent is the insulation company hiding behind a 1960's piece of French legislation when they have been supplying the European construction market for many decades - a market of "free trade" under CE marking, The Construction Products Directive/Regulation and (as with all New Approach Directives) an absolute duty regarding product safety and recall. If French companies truly believe they are hindered from protecting customers by this legislation then perhaps "Fabriqué en France" should carry a serious public health warning.

https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/dec/16/a-raging-inferno-testimony-reveals-how-deadly-cladding-ended-up-on-grenfell-tower​​​​​​​

Edited by user 16 December 2020 23:57:49(UTC)  | Reason: interesting summary acrticle

RT I am glad someone has actually said that :)...I felt like a lone voice in the wilderness...

Because in my mind focusing on the cladding with allow other serious failure to run under the radar...

Sorry for a bit of thread highjacking there...but anything that can be thought of should be thought of ...we just need to remove some pre-convieved ideas of what we need to look at and how...

Originally Posted by: firesafety101

I am in no doubt that an effective smoke vent in the single Grenfell staircase would have enabled more residents to escape from the fire, and allow firefighters a better working environment.

I have to disgree with you there. As I have mentioned, I have attended a fire in Grenfell many years ago. The AOVs on the staircase worked effectively and only minimal smokelogging was encountered. Since then the ventilation system has been replaced and updated.

All staircase ventilation systems are designed to remove a certain quantity of smoke from that vertical space. Whatever the working assumption was when the Grenfell system was designed, it would not have been expected to remove the quanity of smoke generated from scores of flats, fully developed by fire and with the fire seperation between the flats and staircase completely lost.

No staircase ventilation system, or pressurisation system could have coped with the unprecedented demands placed on it that day